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ABSTRACT 
Although the features of individual careers are influenced by the personnel 
administrative rules of work organizations, the rules themselves rarely have 
been examined. Rather, one generally attempts to infer the nature of the 
attainment process by investigating the results of the process, as seen in 
the salary and status trajectories of a population sample, and by relating 
this to individual background characteristics. In this paper, in contrast, we 
directly examine organizational rules. We investigate administrative spec-
ifications with respect to salary advancement and promotion in a variety of 
work settings; in particular, in police departments, public school systems, 
the construction industry, and several private-sector organizations. The 
sources of the organizational rules are union contracts and company data 
about their human resource systems. Based on this material we introduce 
the concepts of simple structure, unitary structure, and amalgam structure 
to summarize the alternate formulations of career evolution that appear in 
the administrative rules. Finally, we discuss the extent to which the ad-
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ministrative prescriptions actually constrain the attainments of individual 
employees. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we describe the ways in which the rules of work organizations 
inf luence j o b mobility and salary a d v a n c e m e n t . Organizat ional charac-
terist ics have rece ived little a t tent ion in the s ta tus a t ta inment and human 
capital l i tera tures (e .g. , Blau and D u n c a n , 1967; F e a t h e r m a n and Hauser , 
1978; J encks , et al . , 1972; Mincer , 1974), though see Becke r (1975; chap. 
2) for a p rovoca t ive d iscuss ion , f r o m a h u m a n capital perspec t ive , con-
cerning the emergence of personne l s t ruc tures . More recent s tudies have 
addressed the role of institutional factors in the achievement process (e.g., 
Bielby and Baron , 1983; D a y m o n t , 1980; G r a n d j e a n , 1981; Rosenbaum, 
1979; Stolzenberg, 1978), although the personnel rules of firms per se have 
not been a focus of sys temat ic analys is . Ra ther , these s tudies have at-
t empted to a s sess the sal ience of a var ie ty of organizat ional f ea tu res— 
such as type of t echnology , firm size, g rowth ra te , and labor marke t sec-
t o r — f o r the a t t a inment s of individuals . 
T h e s e invest igat ions into the c o n s e q u e n c e of organizat ional variables 
have p roceeded mainly by analyzing individual work his tor ies , using data 
se ts that conta in contextua l informat ion about emp loymen t set t ings or to 
which such da ta has been added . In compar i son , we p ropose to examine 
the rules that govern j o b changing and salary a d v a n c e m e n t in different 
f i rms, instead of observ ing the resul ts of such rules as ev idenced in the 
ach ievemen t s of individuals . Personnel regulat ions convey an organiza-
t ion ' s design with respec t to the work ca ree r s of its employees , or its 
intentions with respect to different categories of workers . The rules specify 
condi t ions for e m p l o y m e n t , prerequis i tes for a d v a n c e m e n t , and the ra tes 
of salary g rowth that a firm wishes to assoc ia te with par t icular skill and 
educa t ion g roups . 
The regulat ions that govern j o b changing and salary a d v a n c e m e n t are 
specif ied in union con t rac t s . W h e r e con t rac t s do not exis t , many firms, 
indeed most large co rpora t ions , have a codif ied body of prac t ices that 
permit personnel dec is ions to be m a d e in a coheren t manne r . Somet imes 
the rules rigidly prescr ibe the t empora l pa ths of earnings and occupat iona l 
a d v a n c e m e n t ; we shall v iew such provis ions as templates—molds f r o m 
which individual ca ree r s a re fabr ica ted . More c o m m o n l y , personnel reg-
ulations permit a consideration of training and performance at key decision 
points in the cou r se of emp loymen t . At the o the r ex t r eme , an organiza-
t ion's rules may put considerable emphasis on ability and merit in all salary-
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review decis ions, thereby promot ing a reasonably c lose associa t ion be-
tween remunerat ion and human capital var iables . These a l ternat ive ar-
rangements reflect the work ings of different pe r sonne l -managemen t sys-
tems; collectively, they refer to the insti tutional or " d e m a n d " side of the 
achievement p rocess . Our intent ion is to descr ibe the variety of organi-
zational a r rangements in e f fec t , a s sess their implicat ions for the f ea tu re s 
of individual ca ree rs , and out l ine some of the de te rminan t s of the admin-
istrative provis ions . 
Because there are a n u m b e r of excel lent , comprehens ive rev iews of the 
literatures of s ta tus a t t a inment , human capi ta l , and insti tutional fo rmu-
lations of ach ievement (e .g. , Baron and Bielby, 1980; Kal leberg and So-
rensen, 1979; Stolzenberg, 1975; Spilerman, 1977), we omit here a detailed 
appraisal of these l i teratures . We do , h o w e v e r , wish to commen t briefly 
on the different theoret ical pe r spec t ives as they relate to the main t h e m e s 
of this paper . 
S ta tus A t t a i n m e n t a n d H u m a n Capi ta l F o r m u l a t i o n s 
We suggest that the principal ob jec t ive in s ta tus a t t a inment research 
has been to explain inequality of achievement . Further , the approach taken 
in analyzing inequali ty has s t ressed the in tergenerat ional t ransmiss ion of 
advantage. An emphas i s on inequali ty is ev ident in the very title of J e n c k s 
et al. 's (1972) impor tant m o n o g r a p h ; a conce rn with inequali ty and with 
intergenerational p roces ses is also apparen t in o the r publ icat ions (e .g. , 
Blau and Duncan , 1967; D u n c a n , 1969; Sewell and H a u s e r , 1975; Fea th-
erman and Hause r , 1978). This or ienta t ion of s ta tus a t ta inment research 
reflects a central t heme in s trat i f icat ion theory , namely to dec ipher the 
basis of allocation of scarce r ewards in socie ty . To be sure , there is con-
siderable interest in identifying the mechanisms that influence achievement 
over the life course . Ye t , we would argue , this has been a subord ina te 
theme. The research issues have not been posed in t e rms of account ing 
for an ind iv idua l ' s s t a t u s o r e a r n i n g s at d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s a long the life 
course, in relation to p rox imate cause s ; if they had , the organizat ion of 
work settings and insti tutional rules regarding a d v a n c e m e n t could hardly 
be ignored. Rather , the focus has been on the detai ls of the intergener-
ational process , and the exp lana to ry var iables in t roduced have tended to 
be ones that elucidate this matter (e.g., respondent ' s I .Q. , parental values, 
early peer inf luences , aspira t ions) . 
An ana lys i s of i nequa l i ty p r e s u p p o s e s a p o p u l a t i o n of i n t e r e s t . O n e 
cannot speak of inequality for an individual, nor is it of compelling concern 
to analyze inequali ty within a single firm or indus t ry . The natural popu-
lation to cons ider is the national soc ie ty , and so it is hardly surpris ing that 
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the main status at tainment investigations have been carried out with rep-
resentat ive national or at least regional samples (e.g., OCG I, OCG II, 
The Wisconsin Study of High School Seniors). However , the use of a 
representat ive sample has, in itself, influenced the kinds of causal mech-
anisms that conveniently can be examined. Because the respondents are 
employed in many workplaces , and are not reliable informants about the 
features of their f irms, it is difficult to collect detailed firm-level data with 
which to explore the impact on achievement of organizational character-
istics. Thus , both the emphasis on inequality, and the data requirements 
necessary for this orientation, have contributed to a neglect of institutional 
variables in status at tainment research. 
There is a similar emphasis in human capital formulat ions on individual-
level variables, but the reason here is not a preoccupation with inequality. 
Economists are, indeed, interested in the determinants of earnings over 
the life course (e.g., Becker , 1975; Hanoch, 1967; Mincer, 1974; Schultz, 
1971). A disregard by them of institutional factors can be attributed to 
the acceptance of a theory of at tainment which, in some versions, views 
institutional effects as negligible or as transitory (e.g., Cain, 1976; Wächter, 
1974) and, in other versions, views them as endogenously determined by 
human capital calculations (e.g., Becker, 1975, chap. 2). In either case, 
human capital theory is concerned with the returns to variables such as 
abil i ty, educa t ion , t ra ining, and expe r i ence ; inst i tut ional f ac to r s are 
downplayed because, in terms of the paradigm, they are considered to 
play a minor role. 
Inst i tut ional Formula t ions 
For sociologists, an institutional view can be associated with a shift in 
the research agenda, f rom the concerns of stratification theory (inequality 
and the perpetuat ion of advantage) to issues in the sociology of work (the 
mechanics of at tainment in different organizational settings). In terms of 
the latter perspect ive, it makes sense to inquire into the factors that in-
fluence a worke r ' s salary t rajectory over the life course , or to describe 
the ways in which a firm may schedule advancement for employees who 
have entered via different portals. 
In recent years there has been considerable interest in assessing the 
consequences of institutional factors . However , in contrast with status 
at tainment research, there is no consensus with respect to study design 
or method of analysis. One approach has been to continue working with 
representat ive samples, often national samples, to which contextual var-
iables have been added, such as characterist ics of a respondent ' s industry 
(e .g . , Kal leberg , Wal lace , and Al thause r , 1981; D a y m o n t , 1980). This 
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Daymont, 1980). This 
strategy permits an assessment of the contribution of institutional factors , 
controlling for the effects of individual-level variables. The at t ract iveness 
of this design is that the parameters can be interpreted as "average effects" 
in society; there is no ambiguity concerning the population to which the 
findings refer. The drawback is that a researcher usually is limited to adding 
contextual variables that have been collected for other purposes,1 and 
which may not be the variables of choice for analyzing institutional factors 
in the achievement process . 
A second approach has involved dropping all effor ts at representat ive-
ness and seeking, instead, to unders tand the determinants of at tainment 
in a single firm. The appeal of this design is that it permits the organi-
zational structure to be described in some detail, and allows the interplay 
between human capital variables and position in the firm to be investigated. 
An evident problem exists with respect to generalizing f rom case studies, 
but these investigations nonetheless are revealing about institutional ar-
rangements and the consequences of particular organizational s t ructures 
for individual achievement (see, e .g. , Grandjean , 1981; Halaby, 1980; Ro-
senbaum, 1979; S tewman, 1975; Wise, 1975). 
The possibility of comparing results f rom different case studies is ham-
pered by the fact that company names usually are not disclosed; nor is 
much industry detail p rov ided , as this might lead to ident i f icat ion. 2 A 
comparative analysis of at tainment by a single investigator, using data 
from several firms, is also difficult to carry out because the problems of 
securing access to personnel records are compounded and because a sub-
stantial time investment would be necessary to learn about the organi-
zational makeup of each firm.1 This is one reason for examining corporate 
rules regarding occupational advancement and salary progression—as we 
do in this paper—namely, comparable information about many firms is 
easier to acquire. A more compelling reason relates to the conceptual 
value of this material. An individual 's work history, typically, consists of 
a sequence of affiliations with several employers ; thus, the specifications 
of different firms with regard to career development constitute the primitive 
building blocks f rom which the work histories of salaried individuals are 
constructed. 
With all this said about personnel rules, a question remains concerning 
the relation between individual t rajectories and organizational prescrip-
tions: To what extent does the evolution of employee careers conform to 
the specifications of the workplace? To investigate this issue it would be 
necessary to have available individual work histories for the same firms 
from which information has been obtained on personnel rules. We do not 
have such data; however , as will be apparent , in many organizations little 
deviation is possible f rom the career specifications. 
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ORIGINS OF INSTITUTIONAL RULES CONCERNING 
OCCUPATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND SALARY 
PROGRESSION 
Becker (1975), Spence (1974), Wil l iamson (1975), Doer inger (1967), and 
Thurow (1975) have provided accounts of the considerations that motivate 
work organiza t ions to cons t ruc t salary schedules and promot ion regimes. 
A key issue for employers, according to Becker, concerns the management 
of f i rm-specif ic training. This re fe rs to t echn iques or sorts of knowledge 
that an employe r requi res , but which he or she cannot purchase in the 
external labor market ; a firm must acquaint its employees with these skills. 
If a firm pays for this exper t i se , such as by providing in-house training, 
it has made an inves tment in its emp loyees ; these sunk cos t s are lost when 
w o r k e r s d e p a r t . In B e c k e r ' s v i e w , e m p l o y e r s a t t e m p t to bind t ra ined 
workers to the firm, in recognition of their superior value, through promises 
of p romot ion , salary raises , and employmen t secur i ty . The utility of in-
sti tutional s t ruc tu res such as j o b hierarchies and seniori ty ent i t lements 
can be der ived f r o m these cons idera t ions (see, e .g . , Carmichae l , 1983). 
Where emp loyees are asked to underwr i te part of the cost of their firm-
specif ic educa t ion , such as by accept ing a low initial wage while in a train-
ing program, then , Becker adds , to r ecover this inves tment the workers , 
t h e m s e l v e s , will insis t on r e a s o n a b l e a d v a n c e m e n t p r o s p e c t s and em-
ployment securi ty because the skills they have acqui red have little market 
value. 
Becker does not cons ider o ther motivat ional f ac to r s , bes ides human 
capital ca lcula t ions , that may lead to the same organizat ional arrange-
ments . In par t icular , whe the r or not emp loyees have invested in firm-
specific training, they may wish to see barr iers inst i tuted against lateral 
entry and have high-level positions filled through promotion. Workers may 
also desire to limit the discret ion of employe r s in the realm of promot ion 
and layoff; having these decis ions tied to seniori ty effect ively se rves this 
purpose . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , labor unions may seek cont rac t provis ions 
on these mat te r s , creat ing a more widespread p resence of j o b hierarchies 
and barr iers to lateral ent ry than can be explained on the basis of human 
capital theory . Aside f r o m this obse rva t ion , Becke r ' s (1975:chap. 2) dis-
cuss ion of the m a n n e r in which the separa te in teres ts of worke r s and em-
ployers cont r ibu te to the emergence of a d v a n c e m e n t regimes bears con-
siderable r e semblance to the accoun t in Doer inger and Piori (1971:17-34), 
although the human capital and institutional formulations usually are posed 
as a l ternat ive exp lana tory parad igms. 
The var ious p roposed accoun t s of the func t ions of personnel s t ruc tu res 
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represent a t t empts to der ive some of the inst i tut ional f ea tu re s of work-
places f rom e lementa ry cons idera t ions , using a f r a m e w o r k of opt imizing 
behavior by employe r s , worke r s , or bo th . The e lementa ry cons idera t ions 
that h a v e b e e n s t r e s s e d a r e i n v e s t m e n t s in h u m a n c a p i t a l ( B e c k e r , 
I975:chap. 2), uncer ta in ty and signaling (Spence , 1974), j o b compet i t ion 
and job queues (Thurow, 1975:chap. 4), and bounded rationali ty and com-
plexity (Will iamson, 1975:chap. 4). T h e a t t rac t iveness of these accoun t s 
is that they provide ra t ionales for inst i tut ional s t ruc tures , based on the 
func t ions p e r f o r m e d by the s t r u c t u r e s and the n e e d s of e m p l o y e r s o r 
workers, the latter assessments having been derived f rom a formal theory. 
The limitations of the accoun t s s tem f r o m their cha rac te r as s ingle-factor 
explanations of complex a r r angemen t s . Al though they provide plausible 
reasons for the presence of p romot ion regimes and salary schedules , the 
arguments are too general to explain the details of any particular structure. 
They are so encompass ing as to be compat ib le with most kinds of ad-
vancement regimes. 
D e t e r m i n a n t s of F i rm Di f fe rences in A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Rules 
From the point of view of analyzing the ca ree r s of individuals , it is the 
details of personnel s t ruc tu res that are crucial , and it is the detai ls that 
will concern us here . A di f ferent set of cons idera t ions f r o m the ones out-
lined above relate to the issue of var iat ion a m o n g firms in the f ea tu res of 
salary schedules and p romot ion regimes. Fol lowing Dunlop (1957), Liv-
ernash (1957), Hi ldebrand (1963), and Meij (1963), we e n u m e r a t e several 
of the factors that influence the details of these institutional arrangements. 
The Market Wage 
In many firms, the internal wage s t ruc tu re is de r ived , in par t , f r o m pre-
vailing wages in the c o m m u n i t y for d i f ferent ca tegor ies of labor and levels 
of exper ience. T o obtain informat ion about prevail ing ra tes , large cor-
porations f requent ly conduc t c o m m u n i t y wage su rveys . F i rms may even 
exchange salary da ta . Fo r ins tance , in the N e w York City metropol i tan 
area, the Prudent ial Middle Managemen t Survey and the L O M A Survey 
collect and circulate wage informat ion on detai led j o b titles among par-
ticipating insurance companies. 4 The objective of this activity is to prevent 
large disparit ies f r o m arising be tween a firm's r emunera t ion scale and the 
prevailing wage ra tes , s ince this would lead e i ther to high tu rnove r of 
personnel or to excess ive salar ies , depend ing on the direct ion of the dis-
parity. 
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Union Contracts 
Collective bargaining consti tutes a different method of wage setting. 
Indeed, union contracts serve to insulate the internal wage structure from 
market determination. During the period a contract is in force , the wage 
rates and advancement criteria tend to be rigidly prescribed; they can be 
adjusted in response to market t rends only to the extent permitted in the 
agreement . The parameters of the remunerat ion schedule are renegotiated 
periodically; the outcome appears to reflect considerat ions such as the 
company ' s ability to pass on the cost of a settlement to consumers and 
the union 's ability to inflict sanctions on an employer , as much as an 
assessment of prevailing wages or the cost of training replacement labor 
(Hildebrand, 1963:260-271). 
The "Rational Analysis" of a job's Worth 
Job evaluation a t tempts to replace market determination of wages with 
a systematic assessment of the skills required by a job and the value of 
this expertise to the f irm. The objective is to calculate a fair rate of pay 
on the basis of work tasks , not supply and demand considerat ions. Job 
evaluation involves the identification of task dimensions, the association 
of a job with a particular set of weights on the dimensions, and the as-
signment of a monetary value to each resulting j o b score. Different strat-
egies for assigning weights and attaching monetary values are reviewed 
in Lytle (1954), Husband (1976), and Treiman (1979). The use of this sche-
ma for investigating sex differentials in wage rates and for constructing 
sex-neutral remuneration schedules is discussed in Treiman and Hartmann 
(1981). An analogous, though more subjective, literature takes as its central 
issue the design of salary progression schedules—the structuring of ad-
vancement with the specific intent of motivating performance (Jacques, 
1968). 
Requirements of an Internal Wage Structure 
The wages paid by a firm for different tasks of ten cannot be understood 
adequately f rom an examination of prevailing market rates , the worth of 
each j o b on the basis of rational assessment , or the bargaining positions 
and resources of the unions representing different groups of workers . This 
is because the analysis of the internal wage s tructure is not a problem of 
understanding the setting of individual j ob rates , but a problem of the 
determination of a system of rates , in which certain conditions must be 
satisfied for internal coherence . 
Internal coherence refers to the expectat ions of individual workers with 
respect to the wage s t ructure , based on societal notions of equity and 
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formance suffering. One requirement for internal coherence is that the 
wage rates for different positions in a j o b ladder correspond in rank to 
the levels of the promotion hierarchy. A more general issue relates to the 
dynamics of internal coherence and involves the notions of job family and 
skeleton of the wage structure. 
Job families (Dunlop, 1957) are collections of positions that either are 
linked structurally via a promotion sequence or linked informally by virtue 
of frequent lateral t ransfers . Dunlop contends that relatively stable wage 
differentials characterize the positions in these collections. The skeleton 
of a firm's wage s tructure consists of the salaries of all " k e y j o b s , " po-
sitions that are visible in the organization and well defined in terms of 
task and skill requirements . Salary differentials between them take on 
symbolic importance due to the fact that the workers compare their re-
spective employment situations.5 As a result, the configuration of wage 
differentials among key j o b s changes only slowly, and an alteration in the 
salary of one position, whether the result of collective bargaining or a 
change in the market rate, tends to ripple through the wage structure, 
affecting the rates of o ther key jobs . Subsidiary positions, which fill out 
a job family but are less visible or less well def ined, may be loosely linked 
to the skeleton and exhibit some independence in wage changes, or allied 
closely with it, which is likely to be the case when a j o b family contains 
multiple key positions. 
The preceding comments refer to coherence of the wage structure in 
terms of salary differentials among positions. Another set of considerations 
taps notions of equity in regard to disparities in individual earnings. For 
example, we hold expectations concerning the relation between wage level 
and seniority (or age), when other fac tors such as education are constant . 
Indeed, union contracts frequently cite seniority as a crucial item in ad-
vancement decisions. The impact of societal values on corporate wage 
structures, encouraging an emphasis on differentials between individuals, 
rather than between jobs , is especially evident in Japan where seniority 
and family size are major determinants of salary level in large companies 
(Dore, 1973:98-105). 
The Status At t a inment Model in Relation to Inst i tut ional Rules 
The salary schedule of a firm, together with regulations governing wage 
increases and promotions and those pertaining to j o b t ransfer , layoff, and 
recall, comprise the body of administrat ive rules in reference to which 
the careers of employees must evolve. These provisions differ by industry 
and even by firm within an industry, in consideration of technology, or-
ganizational s t ructure, cus tom, and local c i rcumstance. The evolution of 
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individual careers may be rigidly prescribed by the organizat ion 's rules, 
a situation that we have termed a " t e m p l a t e , " or the rules may serve as 
norms to guide management in making personnel decisions. These alter-
native approaches to personnel administration, and what they imply about 
the development of individual careers , are discussed in the next sections. 
As a final point, we emphasize how very different the present formu-
lation is f rom considerat ions that are central in status at tainment models. 
Only in passing have we mentioned ability, motivation, family background, 
and educat ion, although some of these variables may be incorporated in 
the administrative rules. Likewise, the main studies in the status attainment 
tradition are mute about the relevance of salary schedules, j ob ladders, 
promotion regimes, or other organizational characterist ics. In status at-
tainment models, the individual-level variables are viewed as directly af-
fecting current status and earnings. In institutional views, the individual-
level variables remain important , but organizational s t ructures are intro-
duced as media t ing ent i t ies and as e x o g e n o u s sou rces of inf luence on 
achievement . 
By ignoring institutional considerat ions, s tatus attainment models im-
plicitly treat the labor market as an undifferentiated entity, in which mo-
bility between firms is unhindered by organizational barriers. In this view, 
it is appropriate to estimate a single set of parameters for the labor market; 
the values report average effects for the different variables, and the stan-
dard errors of the parameters refer to supposedly random variations about 
the averages. In contrast, institutional formulations postulate very different 
models of achievement among labor market sectors (defined on the basis 
of firm, industry, or another organizational unit). In some sectors the re-
turns to education are substantial, in others they are negligible. In some 
sectors wages are geared to seniority, in others there is no linkage. In this 
perspect ive, the use of a single model to explain status or earnings in the 
population, several years af ter labor force entry, is misleading because 
there is no single achievement process . Instead, there are multiple pro-
cesses, each stable over time and arising f rom a particular organizational 
structure and system of rules. 
Finally, to put the particular formulation of this paper into perspective 
among institutional approaches , the organizational variables accorded at-
tention here are the designs and intentions of firms in regard to the career 
t r a j ec to r i e s of their e m p l o y e e s , r a the r than the e f f ec t s on individual 
achievement of more basic organizational variables (e.g., size, technology). 
Because the structural fea tures of organizations influence achievement 
indirectly, through personnel policies, and are only one determinant of 
those policies, the present approach is more revealing about the diverse 
ways in which individual careers are fashioned by firms. However , this 
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approach is less informative about the important theoretical issue of the 
relation between organizational s t ructure and individual at tainment . (For 
studies of this question see Bielby and Baron, 1983; Grandjean , 1981; and 
Stolzenberg, 1978). In the next section we do speculate about this issue, 
but only in passing, as it is peripheral to the main themes of the paper. 
VARIETIES OF INSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICATIONS OF 
CAREER FEATURES 
From the point of view of characterizing organizational designs regarding 
the work careers of employees , it is useful to distinguish between two 
formulations: simple structure and unitary structure. In simple structure 
the essential elements that determine an individual 's career course are 
stated in the f i rm's administrative rules. In unitary structure the rules are 
less constraining; they serve as norms to guide management in making 
personnel decisions, but they are not f ramed as explicit prescriptions for 
career evolution. 
Simple structure refers to an administrat ive arrangement in which the 
details associated with salary advancement and promotion are specified 
in a temporal f r amework , often in the form of a schedule. The regulations, 
to be practical, are devised as a funct ion of very few parameters , which, 
invariably, are object ive characteris t ics of the individual workers (e.g., 
education, seniority). Instances of pure simple structure leave no discretion 
for an employer to reward workers differentially and truly consti tute tem-
plates from which the careers of individual employees can be viewed as 
" s t amped . " In practice, evaluations of ability and performance often do 
influence salary growth and occupational advancement , but only at a few 
decision points in the course of employment , associated with critical pro-
motions that serve a gate-keeping funct ion for the organization. As a gen-
eral assessment, management discretion is very limited. Indeed, given the 
details of a f i rm's template and a few salient i tems f rom a worker ' s bi-
ography, the salary and occupational level of most employees can be ac-
curately est imated. 
Simple structure is characterist ic of workplaces in which one or a very 
few career lines encompass the main categories of labor (e.g., firefighters 
in fire departments , teachers in school systems). This administrative sys-
tem is also found in organizations that have multiple career lines when 
little opportunity exists for transferring among them, so that individual 
work histories evolve autonomously for each category of employees (e.g., 
the various occupational t rades in construct ion or in printing firms). 
Simple structure is common in establishments organized along craft lines 
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(typically they contain few entry positions and limited options for occu-
pational change), yet it is not exclusive to craft careers. Production workers 
at Consolidated Diesel Electric and food service workers at 'Chock Full 
O ' N u t s , ' 6 for example, are employed under contracts that contain exten-
sive scheduling provisions in regard to salary advancement (Chock Full 
O ' N u t s , 1975; Consolidated Diesel Electric, no date). Also, f rom various 
accounts of large industrial firms in Japan, it is evident that many elements 
of simple structure are present in their labor practices, at least in regard 
to "pe rmanen t emp loyees " (Ballon, 1969:123-144; Funahashi , 1973:361-
363). In particular, the salary level of a Japanese worker is determined 
to a greater extent by education and seniority than by considerat ions of 
performance (or occupational specialty).7 
This personnel system is of ten a consequence of unionization, because 
labor unions seek to s tandardize work arrangements and reduce the dis-
cretion of employers (Doherty, 1983:16; Ritzer, 1977:252-253, 279; Wallace 
and Fay, 1983:108-110). Unions bargain to obtain a precise definition of 
" i n s i d e r s " and " o u t s i d e r s " with respect to contract rights, to reduce dis-
tinctions among insiders for the purpose of heightening solidarity, and to 
tie any remaining differentials in salary, promotion prospects , and job 
secur i ty to a f ew ob jec t ive m e a s u r e s , such as educa t ion and seniori ty 
(Freeman, 1982; Reynolds , 1978:469-477). In line with these goals, labor 
unions negotiate detailed task specifications and j o b jurisdict ions, pro-
visions to restrict career-line entrance to the lowest rungs, and the order 
of layoff at times of force reduct ion/ Simple structure and career templates 
can be a by-product of collective bargaining for another reason as well: 
labor contracts invariably have as their centerpiece an agreement about 
wages, and a convenient way to state the pertinent provisions is in the 
form of a salary schedule. 
Simple s tructure, then, refers to a personnel system in which salary 
advancement and promotion are, to a considerable extent , specified in 
regulations, rather than an outcome of management evaluations of ability 
or merit. The rules that are formulated tend to be highly deterministic in 
their consequences ; we view them as a template because the career fea-
tures of individual workers can be " r e a d " f rom the provisions. Research 
questions pertinent to this arrangement concern the manner in which tem-
plates are f r a m e d and the var ia t ion in t empla te des igns—the relat ive 
weights accorded to individual-level variables versus aspects of an em-
ployee's organizational biography (e.g., entry portal, seniority); the shapes 
of the returns to the different variables. 
Unitary structure refers to a strategy of human resource management 
in which the organizational rules do not consti tute an explicit template 
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totypical career development to be applied in personnel decisions. As a 
consequence, management retains flexibility with respect to salary de-
cisions, p romot ions , and the shif t ing of w o r k e r s among j o b s . Uni tary 
structure is common in large firms, which have many departments, require 
an assortment of occupat ions , and are not unionized. For such organi-
zations it consti tutes a formulation for rationalizing manpower planning 
and skill development. 
From the perspective of management in a large company, the presence 
of a diversity of work tasks, occupational positions, depar tments , and 
divisions raises several administrative issues. One matter concerns how 
to define job ladders and career lines,9 s t ructures that are essential for 
motivating performance, encouraging skill acquisition, and permitting re-
sponsibility to be assigned in a gradual manner (Wächter, 1974; Williamson, 
!975:chap. 4). Coincident with the delineation of these s tructures is the 
need for flexibility in the movement of personnel among the career lines 
and other organizational units, in order to redress imbalances in the dis-
tribution of manpower that may develop and to expose employees to dif-
ferent facets of a f i rm's operat ions.1 0 To meet these requirements , more 
complex movement pat terns must be permitted than is feasible under sim-
ple structure. 
Another issue concerns control over compensat ion. If multiple career 
lines are present in a f irm, linked by diverse t ransfer opportunit ies, a com-
pensation system based on simple s t ructures would be difficult to admin-
ister, because templates assume that employees who have entered the 
company at the same time, in the same initial position, will progress to-
gether. Rather, given the human resource setting that has been described, 
rationalization of the compensat ion s tructure tends to follow a different 
formulation, one in which a single f ramework of rules governs salary ad-
vancement and promotion in all organizational units. The technical basis 
of this f ramework consists of a hierarchy of some 10-20 nonfunctional 
grade levels onto which all j o b titles in the firm are mapped. Salary ranges 
are associated with the grade levels, and thereby, indirectly, with the job 
titles. 
This solution to the foregoing issues in manpower management facilitates 
lateral movement within the firm because it establishes salary compara-
bility among j o b s in d i f f e r e n t c a r e e r l ines . C o m p e n s a t i o n con t ro l is 
achieved by simplifying the process of setting salaries, separating this en-
deavor from a concern about the details of j o b ladders and career lines; 
the latter are constructed using j o b evaluation procedures (see section on 
unitary structure). At this point our intention was to introduce the concept 
of unitary structure, in order to clarify the sorts of work arrangements 
not included in the following portrayal of career templates . 
5 4 S E Y M O U R S P I L E R M A N 
INDUSTRY AND FIRM DIFFERENCES IN SIMPLE 
STRUCTURE 
In this section we describe some of the ways in which an individual's 
salary advancement and occupational progression may be specified in or-
ganizational rules regarding career development , rather than being an out-
come of evaluations of ability and performance . Because the insitutional 
formulat ions in use vary widely, we examine several specifications from 
different industries. In particular, we outline the career prescriptions of 
police depar tments , public school systems, the construct ion industry, and 
a food service corporat ion. The f irms discussed were selected to highlight 
different template features as well as to depict some representative for-
mulations. 
Police Officer, Phi ladelphia , 1978 
The salary schedule for the different ranks is presented in Table 1. The 
ent ry level pos i t i on—pa t ro lman . S tep 1—paid $15,115 in 1978. Upon 
completion of two years service in the depar tment , a salary of $15,769 is 
reached. Aside f rom small longevity additions ($127.50 per annum after 
each 5-year period of service), the salary for a patrolman does not increase 
af ter the beginning of the third year of emp loymen t . " 
If a patrolman is not promoted to a higher rank, his salary is completely 
specified by the first row of the schedule. N o increment is provided for 
advanced education (the requirement for employment is a high school 
Table I. Salary Schedule of the Philadelphia Police Depar tment , 
June 1978. 
AnnuaI Salary, by Year in Rank (Step) 
Rank N Percent I 2 3 or more 30 years' 
Pol ice Of f i cer (Patrolman) 6 ,746 81 15,115 15,440 15,769 16,519 
Corpora l /Detec t ive 749 9 16,342 16,675 17,030 17.780 
Sergeant 502 6 17,230 17,601 17,977 18,727 
Lieutenant 274 3 19,634 20 ,066 20 ,493 21 ,243 
Higher grades 77 1 — — — — 
Tota l s 8 ,348 100 
Sources: Labor contract between City of Philadelphia and Police Officers' Association (City of Philadelphia. 
no date); correspondence with Philadelphia Police Personnel Office (1983). 
'A longevity supplement of $127.50 is added to an employee's annual salary after each five-year period 
of service in the department, irrespective of rank. This column, therefore, has a different meaning from 
columns (1) to (3), which refer to years in rank. 
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degree) or superior per formance; nor is credit given for prior service in 
another police depar tment . Thus , all officers in an entry cohort advance 
together with regard to salary, irrespective of individual differences in 
age, educat ion, experience, or merit , except that the latter factor is a cri-
terion in promotion decisions and thereby can indirectly influence salary. 
Indeed, promotion is the sole avenue by which individual differences 
in merit can be expressed in the form of remuneration. Yet, how important 
is this consideration as a determinant of a police off icer ' s salary? Union 
contracts do not contain information about promotion rates or the distri-
bution of employees over occupational positions. Such data can sometimes 
be obtained f rom the personnel depar tments of employers or f rom gov-
ernmental agencies. In the case of the Philadelphia Police Depar tment , 
81 percent of the 8,348 sworn officers were patrolmen; an additional 15 
percent were in two grades, corporal /detect ive and sergeant (Philadelphia 
Police Personnel Of f ice , 1983). The max imum salary for se rgean t , the 
higher of the grades, was $17,977, attained af ter two years in rank. Thus , 
in 1978, 96 percent of police officers earned salaries in the range $15,115 
to $18,727, irrespective of seniority, education, or performance. (The latter 
figure assumes 30 years service and includes a longevity supplement of 
$750.) 
To complete an evaluation of the consequences of promotion prospects 
for annual earnings, it remains to consider how many officers advance to 
a rank higher than sergeant; that is, how many move out of this salary 
range. An exact figure for an entry cohort could not be obtained, but a 
reasonable approximation can be const ructed . First, on a cross-sectional 
basis, only 4 percent of sworn officers are in ranks above sergeant; thus , 
the figure is likely to be small. Second, in 1978, there were 30 promotions 
to lieutenant, which translates into a promotion rate of 0.38 percent for 
the year f rom all lower ranks.1 2 A rough est imate of what this rate means 
for advancement prospects , over the course of a 30-year police career , is 
given by the figure (0.38)(30) = 11.4 percent , as the proport ion of an entry 
cohort that can expect to rise above the rank of sergeant.1 1 
In summary, the great majority of police officers in Philadelphia spend 
their work careers earning salaries in a very narrow band. For those who 
are never promoted, the range in 1978 was between $15,115 and $16,519; 
the latter figure assumes 30 years service. A broader criterion of " rea -
sonable career p ro spec t s " can be based on the observation that approx-
imately 89 percent of an entry cohort will not advance beyond sergeant; 
even using this specification, the maximum that an entry-level patrolman 
can expect after 30 years service is $18,727, an increase of $3,610 or 24 
percent over the entry wage (figured on a cross-sectional basis). 
Ability and performance do influence remunerat ion, but they operate 
only through promotion decisions. Further , the salary returns to the initial 
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two promotions are modest and, as we have noted, the prospects for ad-
vancement to grades with significantly higher earnings are small. Thus, 
the major part of variation in individual merit is mapped onto a narrow 
band of salary rewards . Viewed differently, merit does matter , but the 
threshold at which distinctions begin to affect compensation in a substantial 
way is set very high. 
Police Officer, Chicago, 1978 
The entry-level salary is $13,908. After six months it is increased to 
$14,772. Subsequent ly , there are four annual raises, to a level of $18,312. 
The next increments occur af ter 10 years of service and each 5 years 
thereafter (see Table 2 for details). The maximum for patrolman is $22,116, 
achieved af ter 25 years seniority. Analogous to Philadelphia, there is no 
salary increment for educat ion, nor is credit given for employment in an-
other police depar tment . 
Seventy percent of the 13,504 uniformed police officers in Chicago are 
patrolmen. The next higher occupational grades are "special ized police 
o f f i ce r " (investigator, dispatcher) and sergeant. Salaries for the former 
are about $1,000 above a pa t ro lman 's earnings at each seniority level; 
salaries for sergeant average some $3,000 above pat ro lmen 's earnings. 
These three occupational categories encompass 96 percent of the work-
force; thus the schedules I have described pertain to the full careers of 
the great majority of police officers. 
There are important similarities between the schedules for police officers 
in the two cities. In each case, salary is a function only of seniority, except 
indirectly, through promotion. In each city, only two advancement de-
cisions have consequence for the majority of off icers , and the salary im-
plications of even becoming a sergeant, the higher of the ranks, are rel-
atively small. Therefore , in both cities the institutional specifications of 
career evolution provide little room for individual differences in ability, 
educat ion, or merit to be expressed in terms of wage differentials. 
The dissimilar i t ies in the c o m p e n s a t i o n schedu les are equal ly note-
worthy, considering that we are discussing workers in a single occupation. 
In Philadelphia, the schedule for police officers is almost flat with respect 
to years of service (or any other variable);14 if one remains a patrolman, 
the salary difference between a new entrant and a veteran with 30 years 
service is $1,404, a 9 percent increase over the entry wage. In Chicago, 
by comparison, there is a s teep rise; among patrolmen the increment for 
30 years service is $8,208, a 59 percent increase. (Indeed, the salary in-
crement af ter two years in Chicago—$1,788—exceeds the full 30 years 
service di f ferent ia l in Phi ladelphia . ) Even if one f a c t o r s in the conse-
quences of promotion, the assessment remains pretty much the same: 
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assuming sergeant rank at the completion of a police career , salary growth 
af ter 30 years service (computed on a cross-sectional basis) is equal to 24 
percent of the entry wage in Philadelphia, versus 76 percent in Chicago.15 
A Compar i son of Police D epa r tm en t Schedules 
In other cities, the compensat ion schedules1 6 have different features.1 7 
In Boston, salary increments are given for education: $950 for 60 semester 
units of college, $1,300 for a B.A. degree, $1,900 for an M.A. or law degree. 
These are annual amounts , to be added to each year-in-service step. Okla-
homa City also provides salary additions for educat ion, but places a dif-
ferent value on schooling: $264 for 60 semester units, $540 for a B.A. 
degree, $810 for an M.A. In San Jose, there is no increment to the base 
wage for educat ion, but schooling can be substituted for experience in 
the calculation of service steps. Fur ther , in San Jose, a newly hired officer 
can receive credit for up to three years of prior police work. In the majority 
of cities, however , neither schooling nor service in another department 
are deemed compensable factors . 
The universal pattern in police depar tments is that annual salary is prin-
cipally a funct ion of years of service and rank. However , the generosity 
of payment for these factors and the manner in which they are allocated 
over the course of employment differ substantially among cities. This can 
be seen f rom Table 3. The first four columns describe the time course of 
a pa t ro lman 's salary. Oklahoma City and Atlanta aside, the entry-level 
wages in the various cities do not differ greatly18 (column 1); the smaller 
figures in the two noted cities probably reflect the lower cost of living in 
the South and Southwest . 
F rom these roughly c o m p a r a b l e s tar t ing poin ts , the compensa t ion 
schedules specify very different temporal paths in earnings. At 30 years 
service for a patrolman, the increment over starting salary ranges from 
$1,404 in Philadelphia to $8,832 in Washington (column 5). Human capital 
theorists (e.g., Mincer, 1974:80) suggest that seniority payments are re-
wards for higher productivity that is associated with experience. Yet, it 
is difficult to envision that the duties of a police officer in these two cities 
are so different as to warrant disparate returns to seniority of this mag-
nitude. 
The compensat ion schedules also allocate the tenure increments dif-
ferently. In Washington, 20 percent of the 30-year-service differential is 
given in the first 3 years; in New York City, 90 percent is given in this 
period (column 6). The returns to promotion are equally diverse. In New 
York City, a sergeant with 30 years service is paid $5,317 more than a 
patrolman with equal seniority; in Atlanta the differential is $1,833 (column 
7). In New York and Philadelphia, promotion to sergeant is worth sub-
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Table 3. S u m m a r y F e a t u r e s of Police Of f i ce r C o m p e n s a t i o n S c h e d u l e s , J u n e 1978 
Annual salary of patrolmen' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total salary Percent of Increment for 
increase over 30 increase given in sergeant rank, at 
City Entry 3 years 10 years 30 years years service first 3 years 30 years service2 
Philadelphia $15,115 15,769 16,019 16,519 1,404 47 2 ,208 
L o s A n g e l e s ' 15,492 20 ,358 20 ,940 22 ,110 6 ,618 74 4 ,658 
N e w York 13,673 17,458 17,658 17,858 4 ,185 90 5,317 
San Jose 4 15,808 18,314 19,219 19,219 3,411 73 3 ,869 
Omaha 5 13,596 15,864 16,748 17,138 3 ,542 64 2 ,304 
Boston" 12,841 15,921 16,621 16,821 3 ,980 77 4 ,645 
C h i c a g o 13,908 17,448 19,908 22 ,116 8 ,208 43 3 ,156 
Washington 7 13,799 15,595 18,492 22,631 8 ,832 20 4 ,545 
O k l a h o m a City* 11,107 13,113 14,910 15,900 4 ,793 42 2 ,388 
Atlanta" 10,907 12,324 13,936 13,936 3 ,029 47 1,833 
ui 
Sources: Agreements with Police Officer Associations in the respective cities: City of Philadelphia (no date); Los Angeles Police Department (no date); New York 
City Record (1977); City of San Jose (1978); Omaha Police Division (no date); Boston Police Personnel Office (1983); Chicago Police Department (no date): 
Washington D.C. Police Personnel Office (1983); Oklahoma City Police Department (no date); Atlanta Police Department (no date). 
'Entries assume the minimum education requirement for employment, which was a high school degree (or equivalency test), except in San Jose, where 60 college 
credits were required. The calculations also presume no prior experience in another police department. 
:Entry is the salary increment for sergeant, in comparison with column (4). 
'Three levels of patrolmen are identified in the Los Angeles schedule: Police Officer I. II. and III. Movement from Officer I to II is automatic, after 18 months of 
satisfactory service. Movement to Police Officer III is a promotion, in that an exam must be passed and a position must be vacant at this level. Entries in the table 
are for Police Officers I and II. In Los Angeles there is no salary supplement for education; however, college training can be substituted for years of service. 
4Up to 18 months' service credit is given for prior law enforcement experience in another California city. A B.A. degree (plus a service requirement) can increase 
salary by 7'/: percent over the schedule entry. 
5No salary increment for education, but points are given on the exam for employment. 
'Entries are for the day shift. Boston provides an increment for night shift work, equal to $1,018 annually. Salary increments are also given for education beyond the 
entry requirement: $950 for 60 college credits, $1.300 for a B.A. degree, $1,900 for an M.A. or law degree. Finally, Boston provides small salary additions for a 
variety of specialty jobs. 
7No salary increment for education, but points are given on the exam for employment. 
"Salary increments are given for education: $264 for A.A. degree; $540 for B.A.; $810 for an M.A. 
'Salary increments are given for education: $585 for two years of college; $1,1% for B.A. degree. 
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stantially more than the 30 year service differential (co lumns 5 and 7); in 
Chicago and Washington , howeve r , the seniori ty different ial is twice the 
size of the p romot ion inc rement . Again, it is ques t ionable whe the r such 
diverse fo rmula t ions in the re tu rns to p romot ion and tenure reflect real 
d i f fe rences in dut ies or responsibil i t ies .1 9 
T h e essent ia l points of this d iscuss ion a re , f i rs t , that the salaries of 
police of f icers a re rigidly prescr ibed by adminis t ra t ive rules ; only to a 
minor extent a re they inf luenced by cons idera t ions of abili ty, educat ion, 
and performance, variables that are central in status attainment and human 
capital models. Second, the administrative rules specify salary trajectories 
in d iverse ways . In some cit ies, the bulk of seniori ty pay is compressed 
into a few years , in o the r s the p a y m e n t s are spread ove r many years . In 
some cit ies, the eventua l re tu rns to seniori ty a re cons iderab le , in others 
they are quite small . Aside f r o m senior i ty , compensa t ion is provided in 
some d e p a r t m e n t s fo r educa t ion and prior police expe r i ence , though not 
in o the r s . 
Nat ional su rveys of a t t a inment show that the earnings of police off icers 
vary ove r a cons iderab le range , but an a t t empt to explain the variation 
in t e rms of a model of individual ach ievemen t would be e r roneous . The 
salary d i f fe rences do not reflect dispari t ies in individual character is t ics , 
except to the limited extent descr ibed above . They ar ise f r o m communi ty 
dec is ions regarding the s t ruc ture of compensa t ion schedules . In par t , the 
o u t c o m e s of such d e l i b e r a t i o n s t a p cos t -o f - l iv ing d i f f e r en t i a l s b e t w e e n 
geographic a reas , but to a grea te r ex ten t the f ea tu re s of a police depar t -
m e n t ' s schedule a re rooted in more complex cons idera t ions . 
To explain individual differences in police officer salaries, a formulation 
is r e q u i r e d tha t a c c o u n t s f o r community d i f f e r en t i a l s in c o m p e n s a t i o n 
structures, not individual differences directly. An appropriate starting point 
would be to investigate the determinants of schedule features—entry-level 
sa lary , the s t eepness of the rise with seniori ty , the n u m b e r of years of 
inc rease—as well as ancil lary provis ions such as the generos i ty of pay-
men t s for educa t ion and prior service . Lit t le research has been done on 
these sub jec t s , though see Lewin and Kei th (1976) for an excep t ion . In 
an analysis of police m a n p o w e r , they found that schedule min imums and 
m a x i m u m s are func t ions of a n u m b e r of demograph ic var iables , such as 
city size, dens i ty , and police fo rce size. 
As a more general a s s e s smen t , the compensa t i on s t ruc tu re in a city is 
a c o n s e q u e n c e of several intr icate p rocesses . O n e fac to r is the respect ive 
s t rengths of the negot iat ing par t ies—thei r abilities to mobil ize public sen-
t iment and to organize , or a b s o r b , a work s lowdown. A second consid-
era t ion involves the possibili ty of a t radeoff a m o n g schedule f ea tu res . For 
example , depend ing on the age dis t r ibut ion of police of f icers , their union 
may be p reoccup ied with salary m a x i m u m s and re t i rement benef i t s , or 
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with the rate of salary growth in the early years of employment . Inter-
service comparisons fur ther complicate the picture. In many cities, con-
tract negotiations with a police union take place in the context of a f rame-
work of existing salary d i f fe ren t ia l s with o the r un i fo rmed se rv ices— 
firemen and sanitation workers . A recent agreement with another service 
will not be ignored; its te rms will influence the sett lement that can be 
made between the city and the police off icers ' union. As a result, to un-
derstand the features of police salary schedules, one must also consider 
what linkages in contrast provisions, both formal and informal, exist among 
employees of different agencies.2 0 
Finally, because police officer contracts are negotiated at the local level, 
and because the preceding considerations vary in salience from city to city, 
there have been very different resolutions to the task of selecting param-
eters for a remuneration schedule. This has made for a variety of salary-
progression schemes among American cities. Also, contract talks do not 
take place de novo, but against a backdrop of precedent about schedule 
structure that has been built up in a city f rom the ou tcomes of prior nego-
tiations. As a result, differentials in schedule features among locales, once 
established, tend to persist, providing a relatively stable organizational 
basis for the salary differences among police officers in this country . 
Public School Teacher, 1978 
Analogous to the formulation of earnings t rajectories for police off icers , 
the salaries of school teachers are rigidly prescribed by organizational 
rules. These, again, take the form of compensat ion schedules which, in 
most communities, recognize only a very few categories for remunerat ion 
purposes. Also analogous to police depar tment schedules, per formance 
and merit are not rewarded directly in terms of salary, only to the extent 
that promotion prospects may be enhanced. Nonetheless , the majority of 
teachers fail to advance even to the initial supervisory rank of depar tment 
chair, and, for those who do, the salary consequences are modest.2 1 For 
these reasons, we focus on the earnings of classroom teachers . 
The principal features of the compensat ion schedules in effect in 1978 
in a number of cities22 are summarized in Table 4. Entry-level salaries23 
can be seen to vary in a very narrow range, f rom $9,241 in Oklahoma 
City to $11,824 in Washington, D.C. (column 1). The increments for 30 
years of service, however , are more diverse: in Philadelphia, this level of 
experience adds $10,445 to annual earnings, in Los Angeles it is worth 
$5,120, and the return to seniority is even less in several o ther cities (col-
umn 2). 
In the preceding section, the structure of police depar tment schedules 
was described as primarily dependent on seniority. In contrast, the salaries 
Table 4. A Comparison of Public School Compensat ion Schedules, June 1978 
Salary increment {over prior column)' for advanced education, 
at 30 years service2 
(1) (2) 
Increment 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) <10) 
Total salary 
Salary at for 30 vrs. increment for 
entry, B.A. service,3 B.A. + 30 B.A. B.A. M.A. M.A. doctorate, relative to 
City degree B.A. degree credits + 60 + 98 M.A. + 30 + 60 Doctorate B.A., 30 yrs. service4 
Philadelphia $10,077 10,445 0 0 0 2,715 1,828 0 1,961 6,504 
Boston 10,658 8,225 550 0 0 552 1,103 550 613 3,368 
Los Angeles5 ' 10,650 5,120 1,500 1,700 2,600 150 0 0 250 6,050 
New York" 9,700 8,450 500 925 0 425 1,850 0 0 3,700 
Washington 11,824 7,941 3,300 0 0 0 697 683 0 4,680 
San Jose 10,022 4,662 3,885 3,098 0 111 0 0 111 8,537 
Chicago7 11,400 9,575 1,275 0 0 0 975 0 550 2.8(H) 
Omaha 9,425 7,163 471 0 0 1,791 943 0 942 4,147 
Atlanta 9,456 5,292 0 0 0 1,476 0 0 2,965 4,440 
Oklahoma City 9,241 3,865 0 0 0 898 0 0 550 1,448 
Sources• Agreements with teachers ' associations in the respective cities: Philadelphia Teachers (no date), Boston Teachers (no dale). Los Angeles Teachers (no date), 
Chicago Board of Education (1977), Washington, D.C. Public Schools (no date). New York Teachers (no date), San Jose Unified School District (no dale), 
Omaha Public Schools (no date), Atlanta Public Schools (no date), Oklahoma City Public Schools (no date). 
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Sources: Agreements with teachers' associations in the respective cities: Philadelphia Teachers (no date), Boston Teachers (no date), Los Angeles Teachers (no date), 
Chicago Board of Education (1977), Washington, D.C. Public Schools (no date), New York Teachers (no date), San Jose Unified School District (no date). 
Omaha Public Schools (no date), Atlanta Public Schools (no date), Oklahoma City Public Schools (no date). 
'Entries in columns (3) to (9) are increments to be added to the value in the prior column, and then to columns (2) and (1) to compute annual earnings. For example, 
in Los Angeles, 30 credits beyond the B.A. adds $1,500 to the B.A. maximum ($15,770), 60 credits adds $3,2(H), and 98 credits adds $5,800. In several cities, the 
education increment varies with years of service; it is therefore reported assuming 30 years in the school system. 
; For all cities, except Los Angeles and San Jose, an individual's salary (at the 30-year-service point) is computed by summing columns (I) through the highest applicable 
education column. For Los Angeles and San Jose, sum columns (I) through the appropriate post-B.A. credit level (columns 3, 4. or 5) and then add the entries in 
columns (6) and (9), if applicable. 
'Diverse rules apply with respect to credit for prior service in another school system. For example, in Philadelphia, credit is given on a year-for-year equivalency 
basis, minus one year. In Boston, which has 9 annual steps, a new teacher is given credit for up to 3 years of prior service. In Atlanta, credit is given on the basis 
of two years of outside service per annual step in the Atlanta schedule. 
'Entry is the sum of increments in columns (3) to (9). In all cities, except Los Angeles and San Jose, this column conveys the earnings of a doctorate, relative to a 
B.A. (column 2), assuming 30 years service. In Los Angeles, this interpretation is correct only if the doctoral recipient has also completed 98 credits of post-B.A. 
work, in San Jose only if he or she has completed 60 credits. 
'For Los Angeles, the first two post-B.A. credit levels in the table refer to B.A. + 28 and B.A. + 56. 
'The New York schedule is complicated by the presence of several salary differentials for certain kinds of educational studies. The figures presented here are a 
representation that is appropriate for comparison with the other cities. 
'For Chicago, the entry in column (7) refers to M.A. + 36 credits. 
64 SEYMOUR SPILERMAN 
of school teachers are a function of two variables: seniority and education. 
The returns to education are different among the cities, as varied as the 
rewards for 30 years of service. Moreover , there isn't even consistency 
with respect to the method of calculating advanced education. In some 
cities, compensat ion is given principally for course credits subsequent to 
the B. A .—so much for 30 credits, so much for 60, and so for th—whereas 
the salary schedule in other communit ies is responsive only to earned 
degrees. 
This lack of a measurement s tandard, together with the fact that which-
ever calculation is used, the cities at tach different payments to similar 
levels of advanced educat ion, is responsible for the diverse earnings tra-
jector ies of school teachers having identical background characteristics. 
For example, in Washington, D.C. , a B.A. plus 30 credits (without an 
M.A.) earns $3,300 more annually than a B.A. In Chicago, the value of 
the 30 credits is $1,275, in N e w York City it is $500; in Philadelphia, 
which recognizes only earned degrees, no salary addition is provided for 
the coursework (column 3). More extreme are the returns to 60 credits 
beyond the B.A. , in the absence of an M.A. : this training is worth $6,983 
per year in San Jose, $1,425 in New York City, $550 in Boston and, again, 
carries no monetary value in Philadelphia (columns 3 and 4).24 
The salary increments for earned degrees are equally diverse. An M.A. 
adds $3,300 to annual compensat ion in Washington, D.C. , $1,275 in Chi-
cago, and $898 in Oklahoma City (columns 3-6). The maximum allotment 
for advanced education, awarded for a doctorate (together, in Los Angeles 
and San Jose, with the requisite number of post-B.A. credits) ranges from 
$8,537 in San Jose to $1,448 in Oklahoma City (column 10). 
To fully appreciate the diversity in teacher compensat ion schedules, 
we point out that although San Jose apparently considers advanced ed-
ucation more pertinent to teaching effectiveness than experience (as judged 
by the respective salary additions for these two factors), the Chicago school 
system must have reached a very different assessment . In San Jose, the 
increment for a doctorate is almost twice the amount for 30 years of service 
($8,537 versus $4,662); in Chicago the value of this degree is less than 
one-third the payment for 30 years service ($2,800 versus $9,575; see col-
umns 2 and 10). 
One explanation for such extensive differences in the relative returns 
to education and experience can be based on a contention that the school 
systems in different cities are pursuing disparate object ives, or that the 
duties assigned to teachers are dissimilar. If this were the case , and if 
education and experience were to contr ibute differently to productivity 
under the various schooling object ives, it would be consistent with cost 
minimization if the payment associated with each of the factors underlying 
teacher earnings also differed. However , there is no evidence that the 
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goals of schooling or the responsibilities of teachers vary in a substantial 
way among American cities. On the contrary, there is a rather pervasive 
similarity among large communit ies in the United States in the roles as-
signed to school teachers , in the a t ta inments expected of s tudents , and 
in the organizational se tup of individual public schools. 
As a more plausible explanation of the diversity in teacher earnings 
schedules, we suggest it is a combination of the local character of the 
contract negotiations, together with the absence of a clear relation between 
teacher effectiveness and either advanced education or experience. The 
argument for the first point would reiterate the considerat ions already 
outlined in connection with city differences in police office salary sched-
ules—the variety of bargaining contexts ,2 6 the accumulation of precedent 
in a city regarding the structure of the remunerat ion schedule, and the 
possible linkage between the compensat ion of school teachers and that 
of other city employees.2 7 The second point refers to the fact that there 
is no evidence (known to the author) that might suggest what an additional 
year of service or an a d v a n c e d degree con t r ibu te s to any measu re of 
teacher effectiveness. In this c i rcumstance, there is little basis in terms 
of productivity calculations for deciding to pay one price or another for 
advanced education or length of service, and the decision in each com-
munity becomes a purely local matter of selecting a formula that best 
compromises the salary interests of teachers and the cost-containment 
objectives of the school board. 
Const ruc t ion Cra f t smen , 1973 
If the compensation schedules of police officers are principally a function 
of a single variable, and the schedules of school teachers can be specified 
as a function of two variables, the wage rates of craf tsmen in the building 
trades are, with few except ions, unresponsive to any individual-level fac-
tor, whether it be ability, education, experience, seniority, or performance. 
The wage-setting process in the construct ion industry has the following 
features. Contract bargaining takes place between the local of each craft 
and the contractors' association of the locale. A typical agreement provides 
for a single wage rate for members of a craft2 8 and is in force for one to 
three years (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1974:4). The primary wage ne-
gotiation concerns the hourly rate of jou rneymen (the principal occupa-
tional level). Apprent ices are paid a lower wage, but this status is a tem-
porary one, at the beginning of an individual 's work career , and lasts two 
to four years. Upon completion of training, apprent ices graduate to jour-
neymen and are paid the applicable wage. Foremen, who are selected by 
contractors f rom among the journeymen hired for a project , are paid at 
a slightly higher rate, typically 10 percent to 15 percent above the jour-
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neymen ' s scale.29 This appointment , however , is for the duration of the 
job ; the worker rever ts to the status of journeyman at its completion. 
Because perhaps 10 percent of craf tsmen are employed at any one time 
as foremen, 3 0 and because the wage increment for this position is small, 
we focus on the earnings of journeymen . 
The preceding description refers to wage setting in the unionized sector 
of the building t rades. How prevalent , though, are union rates among con-
struction workers? According to one Depar tment of Labor study, 60 per-
cent to 70 percent of building t rades workers are employed in unionized 
establishments31 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1970a:9-10). A second study, 
which examined 17 large metropolitan areas, reported that 75 percent of 
construct ion workers were engaged by contractors holding collective bar-
gaining agreements. The percentage is higher outside the South, exceeding 
90 percent in several cities, and much lower in the South, where the un-
ionized proportion somet imes falls below 50 percent (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1976b:3-4). Among craft specialties, the percentage in unions 
also varies—it is low among carpenters and painters, who can learn their 
skills outside a formal apprent iceship program and can take on small jobs 
as independent contrac tors ; it is high among heavy-equipment operators 
and structural steel workers , who cannot acquire the requisite training 
informally and require union referrals to work on the large, multiple-craft 
projects that are the mainstay of these specialties.32 
The effect of union scales on the wage rates of construct ion craf tsmen 
is more pervasive than indicated by the proportion of contractors with 
collective bargaining agreements . Federal legislation (Davis-Bacon Act) 
requires that any contractor performing work on a federally funded project 
must pay the "preva i l ing" wage rate for each occupat ion. In a community 
in which the majority of craf tsmen are unionized, the prevailing rates are 
usually set at the union scales for the various specialties (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1976b:5). Thus , although accurate figures are not available, it 
is likely, at any point in time, that somewhat in excess of three-quarters 
of construct ion workers are paid the union scales. 
With these prefatory remarks on wage determination in the building 
trades, we report in Table 5 mean hourly wage rates for journeymen em-
ployed in firms with collective bargaining agreements. These data are from 
a 1973 industry wage survey of 17 metropolitan areas (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1976b), the latest wage survey available for the construct ion 
trades.3 3 The entries in the table are not the negotiated union scales, be-
cause this would leave open the question of the degree of implementation 
of union rates , but averages of employee hourly wages. Distributional 
data on wage rates are also available f rom the survey for each craft in a 
city. Although we do not report this information, it is the case that the 
variances are very small, providing evidence for the contention that the 
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negotiated rates are closely fol lowed. In particular, in 33 of the 42 craft-
by-metropolitan areas noted in the table, the hourly earnings of at least 
90 percent of the craf tsmen fall in a 40-cent range. (For instance, in Chi-
cago, 2,428 of 2,479 bricklayers employed by contractors holding collective 
bargaining agreements earned between $9.40 and $9.80 per hour.) 
This lack of variation in a city in the hourly wage of a craf t , in a context 
of the likely presence of individual dif ferences in educat ion, ability, and 
experience, is one datum that is difficult to explain via a status attainment34 
or human capital formulation of achievement . Equally t roublesome is the 
pattern of variation across locales in the relative wages paid to different 
craf ts . To cite a few examples: In New York City, a sheet metal worker 
earns $2.01/hour more than a plumber; in Chicago, however , a plumber 
is paid $0.38/hour more than a sheet metal worker . In Los Angeles, an 
electrician receives $2.71/hour more than a cement mason, but in Cleveland 
the hourly difference is $0.38, in favor of the cement mason. 
Such disparities cannot be understood in terms of cost-of-living differ-
ences among cities. Indeed, even though Newark is a brief commute from 
New York City, a cement mason earns $1.01/hour more in Newark than 
across the Hudson River in New York City; a sheet metal worker earns 
$2.04/hour less in Newark than in New York City.35 Another way to convey 
the import of these data is to note that electrician is the highest-paid craft 
in Los Angeles, but the lowest compensated in Chicago; cement mason 
is the lowest paid craft in San Francisco, but receives the highest wage 
rate in Cleveland! 
Disparities of this type in wage rates cannot be explained by individual 
differences in human capital. The technology of building construct ion and 
the skills required of c raf t smen are very similar in all large metropolitan 
areas; consequent ly , there is little basis for suggesting that the observed 
wage-rate differentials correspond to communi ty variations in individual-
level characterist ics.3 6 Rather , the wage differentials appear to arise from 
considerat ions of supply and demand, and reflect, in large part , the re-
spective bargaining strengths of the cont rac tors ' association and the var-
ious craft locals in a communi ty . In line with this assessment , an appro-
priate formulation for explaining differentials in the wage rates of individual 
c raf t smen, in a national sample, would utilize variables that tap the level 
of construction activity in a locale, the mix of crafts required by a particular 
type of construct ion, unemployment rates, and the like; in short , com-
munity-level variables and measures of the market situation of each craft , 
not individual-level variables. Few studies of this sort have been done, 
though see Shulenberger (1981) for an exception. 
At the same time, one must be careful not to overstate the case for the 
irrelevance of human capital variables. Although we have emphasized their 
lack of salience for understanding the wage rates of individual c raf t smen, 
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craft emphasizes the equalization of work opportuni ty among craft mem-
bers (Caplow, 1954:167-168). Many union locals pursue this objective by 
requiring contractors to turn to the union for referrals. Internally, craft 
locals might utilize ar rangements such as a hiring hall or an out-of-work 
list,37 structures for supplying labor that tend to reduce the variation among 
individuals in hours worked (Bourdon and Levi t t , 1980:61; S t rauss , 
1960:289). Nonetheless , these institutional arrangements are not used uni-
versally, and some association between individual performance (or human 
capital measures) and hours worked is likely to exist. 
Evidence for this contention is indirect, though substantial . In an anal-
ysis by the Department of Labor of 769 construct ion agreements , 50 per-
cent were found to contain clauses that permit an employer to reject ap-
plicants referred by the union. Further, although 54 percent of the contracts 
mandated that hiring be done through union referrals, 46 percent lacked 
such a provision (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1974:18-19). In the latter 
situation, contractors are able to select craftsmen on the basis of reputation 
or in accordance with their recollections f rom prior projects (Blumberg, 
1983; Bourdon and Levit t , 1980:61-62; O 'Donnel l , 1983). As a result, it 
is reasonable to expect some association to be present between education 
and training on the one hand and annual earnings (through hours worked) 
on the other, though the magnitude of the effect remains to be established.38 
In summary, although the details concerning the returns to human capital 
variables are unclear, some facts are evident. As a consequence of the 
particular institutional s t ructure of the building trades, human capital var-
iables do not find expression in terms of wage-rate differences, as is com-
mon in bureaucratic organizations, but in terms of hours worked in a year. 
Also noteworthy, in passing, is that the impact of one form of human 
capital—years of experience—is probably weaker in the building trades 
than in industrial f irms. Because of the physical nature of construct ion 
activity, young men are of ten preferred to middle-aged workers . Such 
preferences surely exist in other industries as well, but the ongoing nature 
of the employment relation in bureaucrat ic organizations protects older 
employees. In the building trades, however, because construction projects 
tend to be of short durat ion, an employer can implement his preference 
without dismissals, by choosing at the start of a project to engage mainly 
young c ra f t smen . The se r iousness of this p roblem is c o n v e y e d by the 
finding that in 22 percent of agreements surveyed by the Department of 
Labor, c lauses were p resen t manda t ing a c o n t r a c t o r to employ older 
workers39 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1974:21). 
An analysis of institutional rules usually provides little information about 
the evolution of individual work careers when they cross organizational 
boundaries and involve several employers . In the cases of police officers 
70 SEYMOUR SPILERMAN 
and school teachers , the organizational specifications are especially in-
formative about career evolution because the depar ture rates f rom these 
lines of work are low;40 consequent ly , the templates describe long work-
history segments . The careers of craf tsmen are of a different sort. The 
occupational model of a craft emphasizes "l i fet ime affi l iat ion" with the 
trade (e.g., Hall, 1975:189), yet frequent employer change and many spells 
of unemployment are a feature of construction work. Further, during times 
of reduced building activity, c raf tsmen drift into other industries; they 
usually maintain their union cards, however , and return to construction 
once the demand for labor expands . As a result of these considerations, 
the institutional rules in the building trades do not determine a complete 
template, from which an individual's salary trajectory can be " r e a d " ; they 
specify only the hourly wage-rate portion of annual earnings for the periods 
in which a craf tsman is engaged in construct ion work. 
Chock Full O ' N u t s , 1976-1978 
Chock Full O ' N u t s is a chain of 65 food service establ ishments in New 
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The labor contract with Local 15500 
of the United States Steel Workers (Chock Full O ' N u t s , 1975) covers 
store employees, exclusive of supervisory personnel and clerical workers; 
the bargaining unit totals some 1,000 members . The formulation of simple 
structure that appears in the contract embodies features of both a single-
rate system and a progression schedule. 
During the three-year contract period, November 14, 1975 ( = t„) to No-
vember 13, 1978, the starting wage for a newly hired full-time employee 
was $1.60/hour; af ter 30 days service the rate was increased to $1.70/hour. 
Subsequent raises are not determined by a schedule, in reference to sen-
iority or to another individual-level characterist ic . Indeed, it is useful to 
view wage raises in this firm as exogenous " s h o c k s , " in the form of oc-
casional across-the-board increments to employees of record at a particular 
date. During this three-year period, the negotiated raises were 25 cents/ 
hour to individuals employed at t0, 15 cents/hour to workers on the payroll 
at to + 12 months , 15 cents/hour at t0 + 28 months . 
This system of wage determination differs f rom the single-rate formu-
lation of construct ion workers in that all c raf t smen, whether experienced 
or newly qualified, receive an identical wage. Thus , f rom the point of 
view of understanding a c ra f t sman ' s current wage, one ' s history of wage 
raises is irrelevant. In contras t , at Chock Full O ' N u t s , a worker ' s current 
wage is tied to his or her date of entry—not via a cross-sectional schedule 
that relates compensat ion to service length (such as applies to police of-
ficers and school teachers)—but by a calculation that sums the entry-
wage and the across-the-board salary raises since the hiring date.41 
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If this wage formulation can be viewed as a single-rate system, modified 
for each employee by the negotiation record since his or her entrance, 
the Chock Full O 'Nuts contract also contains a progression feature, namely 
the allocation of longevity payments . In particular, at the beginning of 
each contract year , employees with 6 months to 1 year of service receive 
a bonus of $150, employees with 1 to 2 years seniority receive $200, etc. 
These annual payments range in amount up to $600 for workers with 10 
or more years of service at the contract anniversary date . 
It should be emphasized that these longevity payments are not incor-
porated into an employee ' s wage rate, but remain separate allocations. 
Also, they are sizeable payments , in relation to a full-time weekly wage 
in the neighborhood of $100 (excluding tips) for most workers . A lump-
sum formulation has two advantages for a firm. First , it serves to reduce 
labor turnover during the major part of the year , concentrat ing voluntary 
departures into a relatively brief interval (the weeks following payment 
of the bonus), thereby facilitating manpower planning. Second, depar ters 
at other times in the year effectively contr ibute a cash allotment to the 
firm—that portion of the longevity bonus accumulated since the last pay-
ment date. In an industry sector in which turnover is fairly high, a bonus 
system can provide a substantial financial return to the firm, in comparison 
with rewarding longevity by means of wage-rate increases. 
Leaving aside these intriguing issues of the motivation and control of 
workers in a low-wage industry, the essential point for this discussion is 
that, conditional on date of hire, an employee ' s current wage rate is com-
pletely specified by the contract provisions. Though the salary calculation 
is more complex than in the prior examples , it is, nonetheless , a version 
of simple structure because neither ability nor j o b performance influence 
salary growth over the employment course . Moreover , in this firm, there 
is no opportunity for promotion, which could provide an avenue for in-
directly rewarding performance with wage increases. All employees in the 
bargaining unit are paid according to the same formulat ion. 
S u m m a r y 
To recapitulate, what we see f rom the four examples of this section is 
rather clear evidence for a very different process of salary determination 
than underlies the status at tainment and human capital models . First, in 
these firms and agencies, management has little opportunity to discriminate 
among employees, to reward them differently on the basis of merit, except 
to the limited extent available, in some instances, through promotion de-
cisions. 
Second, the parameters of the reward structures are determined through 
collective bargaining. Although payments sometimes are made for human 
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capital variables—education and exper ience—the returns to these terms 
bear little relevance to an assessment of their contribution to productivity. 
Our evidence on this point is the highly varied returns to years of service 
or to level of education across police depar tments and public school sys-
tems. Instead, the payments associated with these variables appear to 
have their basis in cus tom and tradition, in the sense that we believe ed-
ucated and experienced workers should be paid more. There are no norms, 
however , about how much more; hence the enormous variations in sched-
ule features . 
This argument is not intended to suggest that the imagery behind the 
human capital/status at tainment model is deficient. Indeed, formulations 
of this genre may be appropriate for the majority of workers in the United 
States economy. Rather , the intent is to indicate that no single model type 
is universally applicable, and that a consideration of labor market seg-
mentation is necessary for ascertaining the boundaries of applicability of 
a specific formulat ion. In the next section, we describe a very different 
wage-setting process which, although it contains strong institutional ele-
ments, has many of the bureaucratic/evaluative features that underly status 
at tainment and human capital models. 
UNITARY STRUCTURE AND AMALGAMS OF 
STRUCTURAL TYPES 
The logic of s imple s t ruc tu re is fairly e l emen ta ry . Ca ree r f e a t u r e s are 
specif ied by t empla te s , which are highly de te rmina t ive in their conse-
quences for individual achievement ; fur ther , administrative rules insulate 
employees subject to different templates, with the result that work careers 
in separate units of a firm can evolve autonomously . The institutional 
arrangements associated with simple structure are as follows: it is a fre-
quent concomitant of unionization; it is especially compatible with craft-
organized enterpr ises; and it is common where the majority of employees 
are engaged in a very few lines of work. 
From the point of view of management , simple s t ructure has several 
drawbacks: the allocation of rewards on the basis of individual merit is 
hindered; very different salaries may have to be paid for equivalent, even 
identical, work in parallel career lines; and labor is compartmental ized, 
with rigid administrative barriers inhibiting the shifting of manpower be-
tween organiza t ional uni ts . T o emphas i ze the last point , unde r simple 
structure the balancing of labor requirements among organizational spe-
cialties can be accomplished only by adjusting the hiring, layoff, and ter-
mination rates. As a result of compartmental izat ion, these rates would 
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have to be tuned separately for each line of work, and it is conceivable 
that a firm will be actively recruiting for one career line while workers 
with comparable skills, in another administrative unit, are being laid off. 
Because simple s t ructure is of ten an outcome of collective bargaining, 
the details of an agreement tend to be idiosyncratic, reflecting the course 
of the particular negotiation. In contras t , unitary structure represents an 
intentional plan with respect to human resource management , one that 
both permits a firm a high degree of control over its compensat ion process 
and provides a basis for equity in the remunerat ion of employees . Also, 
because unitary s tructure presupposes an absence of contractual barriers 
to movement within the f irm, workers can be shifted between lines of 
work as demand necessi tates , restricted only by the costs of retraining. 
This gives management an additional degree of f reedom in balancing its 
manpower requirements. 
Unitary compensat ion is a relatively widespread human resource ad-
ministrative system, especially among large, nonunion bureaucracies uti-
lizing a variety of occupational skills, organized into multiple career lines. 
Several formulations are in use; they differ in important design elements 
yet share in common the following global features : (1) a single (unitary) 
salary structure encompasses all lines work and all organizational units; 
(2) this salary structure is formulated separately f rom a consideration of 
job content and linkages among jobs, whether on the basis of a progression 
sequence or a job family; (3) the assignment of job titles to grades in the 
salary structure is accomplished by means of a systematic process of job 
evaluation, leading to a notion of equivalence among positions that may 
be quite different in their concrete tasks; (4) employee salaries are de-
termined on the basis of individual merit , within the range associated with 
the grade level to which a j o b title is assigned. 
Turning first to j o b evaluation, two broad approaches are in use: clas-
sification methods and job-factor strategies. In a classification system, 
the beginning point is the construct ion of a salary schedule, as a hierarchy 
of salary ranges (grades) and associated task descriptions that characterize 
the work at each level. Job titles are slotted into the schedule—each is 
assigned to the grade that is appropriate in terms of the task s ta tement . 
To perform this operat ion, j o b s are evaluated as comprehensive units, 
not on the basis of scores on component dimensions. The evaluation is 
subjective, by a management commit tee ; the intent is to assign to the 
same salary grade those positions judged equivalent in terms of "wor th 
to the f i rm . " 
In job factor strategies, the starting point is a decision about underlying 
dimensions (e.g., skill, physical difficulty, responsibility). Job titles are 
then evaluated on each of the dimensions. The more sophisticated methods 
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use factor analysis to infer dimensions f rom j o b ratings on multiple meas-
ures and to compute factor scores (e.g., Gomez and Paige, 1979); more 
commonly , these operat ions are simulated by commit tee decisions (e.g., 
Husband , 1976:chap. 5). In either case the result of a factor approach is 
a value for each j o b title, constructed as a linear combination of factor 
weightings and the fac tor scores. The j o b values can be used in various 
ways to assign salary levels to j o b titles: the positions may be grouped 
on the basis of similar values and each category identified with a salary 
grade (as in a classification procedure), or salaries paid by competing firms 
for the same j o b titles can be regressed on the j o b values to determine 
the market relation between j o b values and salaries. The regression strat-
egy is useful for control purposes , in that a f i rm's salary s tructure can be 
compared with the market relation, expressed by the regression line. A 
firm can assess whether its salary s tructure is in line with market wages; 
indeed, depending on the quality of personnel it wishes to attract and 
retain at various levels, it may choose to overpay or underpay market 
rates for a portion of the j o b value range. 
Our interest here is not with the particulars of j o b evaluation methods, 
important as they are for the construct ion of job families, j o b ladders, and 
for specifying t ransfer options between career lines (on these issues see, 
e .g . , Dunn and Rachel [1971], H u s b a n d [1976], and Tre iman [1979]). 
Rather , we wish to focus on the implications of unitary compensation 
structure for individual achievement and for the details of individual ca-
reers . In line with this purpose , the essential matters for consideration 
are the features of salary schedules and the supplementary rules that as-
sociate sequences of salary grades with career lines. 
Under unitary structure, the salary schedule is formulated as a hierarchy 
of overlapping salary ranges (grades). In one version, the salary minimums 
of adjacent grades are linked. For example, let N = number of grades in 
the schedule, SS(i) = starting salary in grade i, and r = percentage increase 
between the salary minimums of successive grades. Then the fairly prev-
alent schedule described by a constant percentage increase between grade 
minimums is conveyed by the geometric progression, 
SS(i) = SS( 1)(1 + r ) ' _ l f o r l « i « N (1) 
If the maximum salary in grade i, MS(i), is specified as a fixed percentage 
of SS(i)—say 1 + m—then , 
MS(i) = (1 + m)SS( l ) ( l + r ) ' - 1 (2) 
These two elementary formulas summarize all the features of schedules 
characterized by a constant percentage increase in the grade minimums, 
and a grade range that is a fixed percentage of its minimum. 
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Insurance C o m p a n y , January 1978 
To make these ideas concrete and provide a context for describing one 
common approach to associating career lines with sequences of grades, 
it is convenient to consider a particular f irm. We outline the compensat ion 
framework of a large insurance company in which the author has access 
to personnel records. The company employs approximately 16,000 indi-
viduals, exclusive of agents who operate on a commission basis. Details 
of the salary schedule for 1978 are reported in Table 6, columns 1 and 2. 
The schedule covers all employees , except for a few hundred unionized 
workers (mainly maintenance men) and a few hundred very senior ex-
ecutives who are above scale in salary. 
The structure underlying the schedule reveals its basis in conscious de-
sign, though it is not sufficiently " c l e a n " to be neatly summarized by 
Table 6. Salary Schedule of the Insurance Company , January 1978 
AnnuaI Salary 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Grade Minimum Maximum Salary Increase in Overlap of 
range, as minimum range with 
proportion over prior prior grade. 
of grade grade as a proportion 
minimum minimum of range 
1 i 9,007 
2 7.000 9,802 .40 — — 
3 7,678 10,741 .40 .097 .693 
4 8,460 11,848 .40 .102 .673 
5 9,229 13,387 .45 .091 .630 
6 10,076 15,120 .50 .092 .656 
7 11,236 16,854 .50 .115 .691 
8 12,513 18,770 .50 .114 .694 
9 13,817 20,726 .50 .104 .717 
10 15,237 22,840 .50 .103 .721 
II 16,672 25,015 .50 .094 .741 
12 18,106 27,152 .50 .086 .764 
13 19,513 29,250 .50 .078 .785 
14 20,960 31,450 .50 .074 .790 
15 22,641 33,950 .50 .080 .779 
16 24,492 36,750 .50 .082 .772 
17 26,356 39,550 .50 .076 .788 
18 28,351 42,550 .50 .076 .789 
19 30,600 45,950 .50 .079 .779 
20 33,050 49,600 .50 .080 .779 
'Minimum varies by organizational unit in the company. 
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equations (1) and (2). In particular, the salary range for a grade, as a per-
centage of the grade minimum, varies f rom .40 to .50; the latter figure 
applies to grades 6 -20 (column 3). The relation between the minimums 
of successive grades is reported in column 4. These entries differ from 
grade to grade,42 though they hover about the value r = .090. Even though 
the simple formulas of this section are not exact for the insurance company, 
they reproduce the features of the schedule with fair accuracy; for example, 
using r = .090, SS(2) = $7,000, and m = .50, we calculate SS( 18) = 
$28,202 versus $28,351 in the table, MS(18) = $42,304 versus $42,550 in 
the table. 
In descr ib ing uni tary s t ruc tu re , we con t inue to use the te rm salary 
schedule. However , this formulation of compensat ion is quite different 
f rom the schedules described under simple s tructure, in that it lacks a 
temporal dimension. There is no notion here of salary progression over 
time, from which an individual's earnings could be computed as a function 
of years of se rv ice . Ra the r , this " s c h e d u l e " is a stat ic c lassif icatory 
f ramework for associating wage ranges with job titles. An employee ' s sal-
ary can vary within the range assigned to his or her j ob ; the periodic 
determination of an individual 's salary is made on the basis of a merit 
evaluation by management and presumably includes a consideration of 
length of service and educat ion, though not in te rms of a precise formula. 
Implementation of a unitary wage administrative system requires the 
insertion of job titles into the schedule and the specification of opportunity 
in different lines of work. Relevant to these issues, the insurance company, 
along with many corporat ions that utilize unitary compensat ion, has de-
veloped a set of quasi-occupational categories—job foci4 3—to simplify the 
classification of its employees . These codes sometimes designate genuine 
occupat ions (e.g., secretary, file clerk) and sometimes task areas (e.g., 
corporate relations, investment funct ions) . Within the company , the ca-
reers of employees are t racked, not by j o b titles (which can be worded 
by a manager with some freedom),44 but by the approximately 40 company-
wide foci and by salary grade. Individual j ob titles are assigned a focus 
code and a grade level via a j o b evaluation procedure;4 5 indeed, because 
the insurance company allots a sequence of grade levels to each focus 
code (Table 7), the foci effectively specify opportunity in the different 
lines of work . 
Within a career line, the grade levels provide only a rough indication 
of individual earnings because of the broad salary range associated with 
each (Table 6, column 3). However , the grades serve another purpose in 
the insurance company. They designate status levels within a line of work 
(e.g., Secretary 1, Secretary 2, etc.). Indeed, it is in terms of salary grades, 
rather than in reference to j o b titles, that promotion is defined. A salary 
increase within a grade can be granted by an employee ' s manager; grade 
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c h a n g e s r e q u i r e a m o r e f o r m a l e v a l u a t i o n a n d t h e a p p r o v a l o f a t l eas t an 
a s s i s t a n t v i c e p r e s i d e n t . 
An individual typically will spend several years within a grade , this 
in te rva l p u n c t u a t e d by s e v e r a l sa l a ry r a i s e s , p e r m i t t i n g him o r her to 
progress o v e r the salary range of the grade . Periodical ly, the employee 
may be cons ide red fo r p romot ion to a higher grade , within the limited 
sequence of grades assigned to the j o b focus. Promotion may be associated 
with a change in responsibi l i t ies or it can be a r eward for length of service, 
without involving an a l tera t ion in dut ies . Upon reaching the ceiling grade 
of a j o b focus , f u r t h e r a d v a n c e m e n t usually requi res a shift to a different 
focus that has a higher ceiling level ( job openings are pos ted and may be 
" b i d f o r " by qualified employees ) . 
With respect to an individual ' s salary t r a j ec to ry , it should be noted that 
even if one is never p r o m o t e d , his or her salary can increase , merely f rom 
seniori ty and con t inued adequa t e p e r f o r m a n c e , to the m a x i m u m of the 
grade , a f igure c o m m o n l y 50 percent above the grade min imum (Table 6). 
H o w e v e r , a f ew p romot ions are the no rm in most ca ree r s . Fo r example , 
according to personnel records of workers hired by the insurance company 
during 1973 and still employed at year-end 1978, the median n u m b e r of 
grade increases during this interval was three. The average worker entered 
in Grade 3, at a salary c lose to the grade min imum ($7,678 in the 1978 
schedule);4 6 f ive years later this individual was in Grade 6. Assuming that 
no fu r the r p romot ion is r ece ived , the salary is likely to progress to a figure 
close to the grade maximum—$15,120 in the 1978 schedule. This represents 
an increase ove r the ca ree r cou r se of 97 pe rcen t , c o m p u t e d on a cross-
sectional basis . 
This es t imate probably unde r s t a t e s the t rue amoun t of mobility for an 
average employee . T h e j o b foci typically span 4 - 8 salary grades (Table 
7) and post ing provis ions for open j o b s facil i tate changing depa r tmen t and 
j o b focus , permit t ing f u r t h e r upward m o v e m e n t . It is not possible , on the 
basis of examina t ion of a single ins tance of uni tary s t ruc ture , to d raw 
conc lus ions about median salary t ra jec tor ies under this inst i tut ional ar-
rangement. Nonetheless , I would speculate that the greater rise in earnings 
ove r the ca ree r course in the insurance c o m p a n y , c o m p a r e d with the tra-
j ec to r i e s repor ted earlier,4 7 is charac ter i s t ic of uni tary s t ruc tu re , if only 
because of the pressure by unions, under simple structure, to narrow salary 
dif ferent ia ls a m o n g worke r s in a c o m m o n bargaining unit ( F r e e m a n and 
Medof f , 1984:78-89). 
H o w e v e r , if an a s se s smen t about average salary t ra jec tor ies under the 
two a r r angemen t s is specula t ive , we are on surer g round with respect to 
the variance of emp loyee earnings . U n d e r simple s t ruc ture , the locks tep 
salary progression means a small variance at any point in the career course 
for worke r s in the same enter ing cohor t , having identical c redent ia l s on 
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the variables recognized in the schedule. What variation does exist arises 
from di f fe rences in the ra te of p romot ion ; h o w e v e r , occupa t iona l ad-
vancement is infrequent under simple structure. In contrast, under unitary 
structure, both the linkage of salary increases to performance evaluations, 
and the greater opportunity for promotion, make for considerable earnings 
variation. As an illustration, in the insurance company , although three 
grade increases was the norm for the observat ion interval, 16 percent of 
employees advanced by four salary grades, 7 percent by 5 or more grades, 
and 12 percent failed to move f rom their entering grades.4 8 
To conclude this section, we point out that unitary structure provides 
an institutional basis for salary determination that is compatible with the 
conceptual imagery of status a t ta inment , at least as the latter formulation 
would apply to achievement in a single firm. Under unitary s tructure, 
one's salary is not based on supply-and-demand calculations for different 
occupational specialties; a considerat ion also absent f rom the status at-
tainment model. Nor , for that mat ter , are calculations of power and bar-
gaining position relevant mat ters ; these factors also are omitted in status 
attainment. Rather, unitary structure is based on a formal assessment of 
the value of each j o b to a f irm, an evaluation that is an analogue to the 
calculation of occupational s tatus or prestige in the wider social system. 
Under unitary s tructure, the determination of an individual 's salary re-
flects, first, his or her j o b ass ignment—the matching of workers and po-
sitions by comparing individual credentials with stated task requirements 
(such as in a job posting)—and, second, per formance evaluations made 
over the course of employment . The imagery behind the status attainment 
model is consistent with this f r amework , although it is not compatible 
with the a s sumpt ions that under ly salary de te rmina t ion unde r simple 
structure. 
Even if the status at tainment formulation provides a reasonable starting 
point for analyzing career evolution in a firm characterized by unitary 
structure, the details of a model of individual achievement need to be very 
different. Considerat ions of organizational s t ructure must still be assigned 
a principal role; note, for example, the constraints on upward mobility in 
the insurance company posed by the restricted j o b foci ranges (Table 7). 
Other considerations central to understanding the details of salary ad-
vancement in a firm, such as the determinants of promotion and departure, 
have no clear counterpar t in status at tainment models.4 9 
To provide some motivation for the importance of organizational struc-
ture, I would add that , based on a cursory examination of personnel rec-
ords from the insurance company , I expect the achievement process to 
be characterized by extensive nonlinearities; for example, the determinants 
of promotion f rom Grade 3 to 4 are likely to be quite different f rom the 
factors relevant to advancing f rom Grade 15 to 16. Viewed f rom this per-
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spec t ive , an issue such as the d i sadvan tages exper ienced by women in 
the e c o n o m y may take the fo rm of barr iers to movemen t be tween certain 
g rades , ra ther than the f o r m of a uni formly lower p romot ion rate. An 
obv ious point of potent ial b lockage fo r w o m e n in the insurance company 
would be the ceiling grades of the clerical j o b foci (Table 7). 
A m a l g a m s of S t ruc tura l T y p e s 
Al though simple s t ruc tu re and uni tary s t ruc ture descr ibe real employ-
ment set t ings, these adminis t ra t ive specif ica t ions are polar oppos i tes in 
t e rms of the author i ty they permit to managemen t in personnel mat ters 
and , as a c o n s e q u e n c e , in t e rms of the de te rminan t s of individual achieve-
ment . T h e two speci f ica t ions a lso d i f fer with respect to the organizational 
env i ronment in which each is p reva len t : one in unionized es tabl ishments 
domina ted by a very f e w ca ree r l ines, the o the r in large nonunionized 
en te rpr i ses conta ining many occupa t iona l special t ies . 
Pe rhaps more c o m m o n are amalgam fo rmula t ions , which d raw their 
provis ions f r o m each of the pure types . Large , complex , unionized or-
g a n i z a t i o n s f ind s imple s t r u c t u r e an i n a d e q u a t e mode l f o r pe r sonne l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , b e c a u s e of t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e m a n p o w e r - c o o r d i n a t i o n 
p rob lems that s tem f r o m the insulat ion of lines of work and because of 
the potent ial fo r salary inequit ies be tween j o b s in different ca ree r lines 
with similar t a sks and responsibi l i t ies . Uni ta ry s t ruc ture , in turn, is un-
accep tab le to labor unions , wi thout ex tens ive modif ica t ions , because of 
the lat i tude it pe rmi t s to managemen t in personnel affa i rs . 
T h e adminis t ra t ive solution f r equen t ly adop ted in this employmen t con-
text is a mixed specif icat ion. Many vers ions exist because each is an out-
c o m e of a bargaining p rocess and ref lec ts the condi t ions part icular to that 
negotiat ion. What the di f ferent vers ions share are the ob jec t ives of (a) 
rationalizing the wage structure through construction of a firm-wide salary 
schedule , (b) c rea t ing a possibili ty fo r worke r f lows be tween depa r tmen t s 
and be tween lines of work , and (c) within the contex t of this integrated 
f r a m e w o r k , limiting managemen t discret ion in the sett ing of salaries and 
in o the r personnel mat te r s . 
Mixed speci f ica t ions requi re a par t icular bargaining env i ronmen t . They 
are appl icable mainly whe re a f i rm (or an individual plant) is organized 
by a single union. As a less-restr ict ive set t ing, the bargaining unit might 
conta in a ma jo r ca tegory of emp loyees , such as all blue-collar worker s , 
but exc lude some occupa t iona l g roup organized a round di f ferent ca reer 
lines and having separa te en t ry por ta ls , such as clerical worke r s . The es-
sential point is that the bargaining unit should be fairly comprehens ive , 
because the movement possibilities of workers , as well as a union's interest 
in maintaining salary equi ty be tween di f ferent j o b s , is res t r ic ted to the 
posi t ions cove red in the labor ag reement . 
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Amalgam specifications, typically, have the following features : 
1. The wage rates of jobs covered by the contract are set collectively, 
as an integrated system of rates. A formal job evaluation procedure is 
frequently utilized for this purpose (by 54 percent of manufacturing firms 
in the United States, according to Bureau of National Affairs [1979:105]). 
United States Steel (1977:56), for example , employs a factor procedure 
(training, skill, responsibility, effor t , and working condit ions are the fac-
tors); Consol idated Edison uses a hybr id sys t em that a p p r o x i m a t e s a 
ranking method (Consolidated Edison Industrial Relations Office. 1984). 
The process of calculating scores for the individual jobs usually is su-
pervised by a joint management-union commit tee . 
2. Either a single wage rate is assigned to each job covered by the 
contract (e.g., Bethlehem Steel, 1977:92-93) or a salary range is associated 
with a job (e.g.. Consolidated Edison, no date:81-94; Lockheed Aircraft , 
no date: 120-139). Where a salary range is used, advancement within the 
range is commonly scheduled in terms of seniority, ra ther than dependent 
on employer evaluations. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1978:46), single rates were assigned in 48 percent of the 1,691 contracts 
they surveyed; rate ranges were assigned in 36 percent . Where ranges 
were specified, automatic salary increases based on seniority were re-
sponsible for the progression in 52 percent of the contracts ; an additional 
25 percent of the contracts based progression on length of service, provided 
that work pe r fo rmance was sa t i s fac to ry (Bureau of Nat iona l Affa i r s , 
1979:105-106).50 Provisions such as these are reminiscent of simple struc-
ture, because of the minimal intervention permitted to management in 
influencing the course of a worker ' s salary. 
3. "Post ing and bidding" designs are employed extensively for filling 
jobs rated above the entry level. Given the fact that posting and bidding 
requires the availability of detailed j o b descriptions, this mechanism for 
filling vacancies of ten is instituted when formal job-evaluat ion methods 
are adopted for setting wage rates, because job descriptions are a necessary 
element of that process as well. Posting and bidding arrangements facilitate 
more-complex j o b changes than are possible under simple s tructure, in-
volving shifts of department and career line; further, they limit management 
discretion in advancement decisions because it is the individual worker 
who initiates a "b id . " Contract provisions also are explicit about the length 
of time a vacancy must be posted before management may fill it by re-
cruiting from outside the firm. 
4. Although the use of job evaluation, together with posting and bid-
ding, permits the piecing together of complex individual careers f rom seg-
ments in different lines of work, analogous to the possibilities under unitary 
structure, there are elaborate rules in amalgam structures that specify per-
missible moves. Indeed, perhaps the most apparent difference between 
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mixed specifications and instances of pure unitary structure concerns the 
extensive codification of job-change rules in the union contracts . The fol-
lowing are illustrative of these details: 
Promotion. According to Bureau of National Affairs (1979:74), seniority 
is the sole factor in promotion in only 10 percent of agreements in man-
ufacturing industries. However, it is the "determining fac tor" in 41 percent 
of contracts, the provision commonly stating that the most senior employee 
will be promoted provided he or she meets the minimum qualifications 
for the job.5 1 An additional 25 percent of contracts assign a lesser role to 
seniority, requiring that it be considered along with o ther qualifications 
or invoked where they are equal for competing applicants. 
There remains the issue of which " c l o c k " is relevant in the calculation 
of promotion seniority, a considerat ion intimately tied to the specification 
of the promotion district. In some contracts, the pertinent clock is duration 
in the j o b classification; in other agreements it is duration in some or-
ganizational unit; in still o thers plant seniority is the applicable factor. 
Where the last pertains, it usually is combined with a " d e a d t i m e " pro-
vision: upon accepting a promotion the successful applicant is ineligible 
for fur ther advancement during a certain time interval.52 
Transfer. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1970b:41), a 
transfer is a "permanent movement from one job to a different one carrying 
the same or a lower labor grade or rate of p a y . " Transfers are sought in 
order to enter a department or a line of work with better working conditions 
or with more favorable advancement opportunit ies. Contract provisions 
regarding these moves are stated in terms of seniority, of ten with the re-
quirement that an applicant be qualified to perform the work. In some 
cases , the clock for calculating t ransfer seniority may be the same as the 
promotion clock; in others , the t ransfer district—and hence the pertinent 
c lock—may differ f rom the seniority computat ion. 
Upon transferring to a different depar tment , promotion seniority in the 
new organizational unit must be determined. Specifications vary, f rom 
requiring a t ransferred employee to enter at the bot tom of the seniority 
list to permitting the employee to carry his or her prior seniority into the 
new depar tment (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1970b:46-47). A more in-
tricate calculation relates to the determination of employment security for 
a t ransferred employee at a time of layoff or labor force reduction. 
Layoff and Bumping. Accord ing to the Bureau of Nat ional Affa i r s 
(1979:51), in 72 percent of contracts seniority was the sole or determining 
factor in selecting employees to be laid off. Layoff provisions can be quite 
complex, in that one may be released f rom an organizational unit or a job 
classification without being discharged f rom the firm. Provisions on this 
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subject ordinarily involve the monitoring of several clocks: At a time of 
force reduction, the least senior worker in the bumping district will lose 
his or her job in the unit. Depending on the contract rules, it may be 
possible to return to the j o b held prior to a promotion or a t ransfer and 
the employee's seniority in that unit, relative to o ther workers , would 
determine his or her subsequent employment status.5 3 
To minimize the disruptions that would be created by "chain bumping," 
an agreement may require the bumping emp loyee to have a specif ied 
amount of seniority above that of the worker he or she would displace. 
Also, many contracts prohibit bumping into a higher classification, which 
serves to limit the secur i ty of some t r ans fe r red e m p l o y e e s . Still o the r 
clauses may prohibit bumping into designated units, to ensure that certain 
categories of skilled workers will not be displaced (Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, 1972:35-40). 
To provide a sense of the complexity of the contract provisions and 
the multiple clocks that must be monitored, we report a prefatory note 
from one contract: " F o r the purpose of this agreement employees shall 
have four types of seniority: . . . (1) Job seniority is defined as the length 
of service in a job classification . . . (2) Group seniority is defined as the 
length of service in a group within a depar tment . . . (3) Department sen-
iority is defined as the length of service in a depar tment . . . (4) Plant 
seniority is defined as the length of cont inuous service f rom the most 
recent date of hire with the c o m p a n y " (Champion Papers , 1969). Such 
extensive detail is not uncommon in amalgam specifications, because the 
intent of this administrative structure is to facilitate the movement of em-
ployees while limiting managemen t d iscre t ion in select ing among the 
workers. 
CONCLUSIONS: INSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICATIONS 
OF ATTAINMENT 
Most research on the determinants of achievement has addressed what 
can be termed an " inverse p rob lem"—given the at tainments of a popu-
lation sample, toge the r with their background cha rac te r i s t i c s , can the 
transformation funct ion (i.e., the nature of the at tainment process) 
be inferred? In contrast , in this paper , I have examined an aspect of the 
achievement process in which the t ransformation funct ion can be ob-
served directly, in the form of organizational rules about salary 
and status advancement over the career course . 
These rules are diverse. The institutional specifications are f ramed dif-
ferently across industries and economic sectors. The rules can be highly 
determinative of an individual 's career features or weakly so; they can 
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describe t rajectories over the full duration of employment or refer only 
to constraints and options f rom one ' s current position; they may incor-
porate employer evaluat ions of merit or be t ransparent to such assess-
ments; they may be written as a funct ion of one, several, or even of no 
background characterist ic . To make sense of the different premises that 
underly organizational designs, I have suggested that the administrative 
regulations can be profitably grouped into three analytic categories, the 
basis of the classification being the extent and manner by which the rules 
prescribe, even constrain, career development . 
Simple structure refers to a body of regulations that is descriptive of 
salary and status t rajectories over the full duration of employment . The 
administrative specification usually takes the form of a schedule, in which 
career rewards are linked to length of service and, possibly, to a few other 
objective background characterist ics. To emphasize the high degree of 
determination of career rewards , 1 have associated the term " templa te" 
with this formulat ion. 
On the basis of an examination of union contracts f rom some 60 work 
organizations, it is evident that there is an industry effect to the diversity 
of the specifications, especially in regard to the qualitative aspects of a 
formulat ion—which human capital variables are associated with financial 
rewards. Beyond this, there remain considerable differences among firms 
in an industry, with respect to the compensat ion amounts assigned to par-
ticular levels of a variable (e.g., the returns to education among school 
systems). The analysis of simple structure is also revealing about the points 
along the career course at which evaluations of ability and merit (as well 
as background characterist ics not incorporated into the personnel rules) 
can influence salary advancement. Indeed, for the subset of the labor force 
employed unde r s imple s t ruc tu re s , an analys is of the de t e rminan t s of 
earnings, as well as status, should focus on explaining discrete events: 
choice of initial employment , subsequent promotions, and firm changes. 
This approach would separate that aspect of career development which 
is scheduled in organizational rules f rom the part attr ibutable to merit and 
performance . 
Unitary structure constitutes a different administrative framework. Here 
the salary schedule lacks a temporal dimension; it is an equating mech-
anism for establishing comparabili ty a m o n g j o b s in different lines of work. 
Job ladders are assigned sequences of salary grades, which effectively 
describe the bounds of opportuni ty for the majority of workers in a firm. 
In contrast with simple s tructure, managers have considerable latitude in 
evaluating employees and rewarding them on the basis of performance. 
Indeed the role of human capital variables appears quite different in the 
two formulat ions. Under unitary s tructure it is merit and performance 
that are remunera ted , the returns to education and experience (seniority) 
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arise largely from their association with performance. Under simple struc-
ture, the human capital variables are rewarded directly, irrespective of 
performance, at least in routine salary advancement . 
1 have had less to say about unitary structure than about simple struc-
ture. Because the former is characteristic of non-unionized firms, the rules, 
and policy statements f rom which they derive, are not easily accessible. 
Further, the implications of unitary s tructure for long periods of career 
evolution are difficult to assess . The salary schedule reports broad salary 
ranges and the regulations prescribe local moves , prospects f rom one ' s 
current position. The fact that there of ten are several options makes it 
difficult to describe typical career t rajectories f rom an examination of the 
rules. 
For these reasons, on the basis of my data, I can say little about the 
variation in career t rajectories , by firm or industry. However , the internal 
logic of this formulation makes it evident that much of the total variation 
among individuals , emp loyed in e s t ab l i shmen t s governed by uni tary 
structures, is within-firm. On the basis of my analysis and these comments 
I would suggest that unitary s tructure is more efficient than simple struc-
ture in sorting out workers by ability and productivity, over the career 
course, and, fur ther , that the effects of firm and industry on attainment 
are weaker under this rules f ramework than under simple structure. 
Amalgam formulations represent a synthesis of the preceding specifi-
cations. As in the case of simple s t ructure , there is a high degree of de-
termination of career features by the administrat ive rules, but the manner 
of determination is different . Akin to unitary s tructure, it is not long-term 
rewards that are prescribed in the regulations (e.g., salary as a funct ion 
of years of service), but local rewards and options (e.g. , current salary 
and one 's standing in the queues for promotion or t ransfer , conditional 
on present position). 
With the delineation of these categories5 4 1 have sought to begin the 
development of theory concerning human resource systems and what they 
mean for individual achievement . The emphasis here has been on the in-
stitutional determination of career fea tures , as seen through the particular 
lenses of organizational rules. A next issue that requires s tudy, but upon 
which I have only touched, concerns the linkage between organizational 
rules and the more fundamenta l structural and contextual characterist ics 
of firms. 
Even without the benefit of systematic empirical investigation, it is ev-
ident that the analytic categories introduced in this paper correspond to 
different organizational architectures, institutional requirements, and labor-
management arrangements . Simple s t ructure , for instance, is associated 
with an employment setting in which corporate success does not require 
great flexibility in shifting employees among lines of work. This could be 
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because there are few lines of specialization, because workers are hired 
for short durat ions, or because the technology is stable and worker reas-
signments due to technological change are not expected. Adding to the 
likelihood of simple s t ructure in a f i rm—and, possibly, a consequence of 
the preceding organizational features—would be the presence of collective 
bargaining along occupational lines. 
Unitary structure, in comparison, is suited to large, heterogeneous firms 
that employ an assor tment of skills and occupaional specialties, especially 
when the employment relation tends to be of long duration and flexibility 
is necessary in the reassignment of manpower among lines of work. This 
characterization covers many white collar bureaucracies and industrial 
enterprises; indeed, the procedures of j o b evaluation and compensation 
design are largely independent of technology. Amalgam structure pertains 
to much the same sort of organizational context but reflects the rigidities, 
imposed by collective bargaining agreements . 
As a theoretical framework, these categories overlap with those of other 
investigators. Webe r ' s (1947:329-336) description of bureaucrat ic admin-
istration—a frequent starting point for studies of work careers in orga-
nizational settings (e.g., Maniha 1975; Halaby 1978)—would apply to most 
f irms classified here under unitary structure or amalgam structure, as well 
as to some cases of simple s t ructure (e.g., police depar tments and public 
school systems). For this discussion, the relevant point in Weber 's account 
is his remark (1947:334) that advancement in a bureaucracy is determined 
"accord ing to seniority or achievement or b o t h . " In stating this condition 
he does not address the implications of the particular choice. In the present 
analysis, in contrast , the categories are based very much on a distinction 
between the two modes of reward. 
Closer in intent to the present formulation are recent reports by Al-
thauser and Kalleberg (1981) and Grandjean (1981). The former develop 
the notions of " f i rm labor m a r k e t " and "occupat ional labor marke t , " 
both subcases of "p r imary labor m a r k e t " (in contrast with "secondary 
labor marke t " ) . While this distinction is hardly novel, and echoes similar 
elaborations by Doeringer and Piore (1971) and St inchcombe (1959), Al-
thauser and Kalleberg proceeded beyond the earlier studies toward op-
erationalizing the concepts and relating them to issues in career devel-
opment . Grandjean investigated a "bureacra t ic labor m a r k e t , " a concept 
r a the r similar to " f i r m labor m a r k e t . " What is consequen t i a l about 
Grand jean ' s study of a t ta inment , and foreshadows the present paper, is 
his sensitivity to the scheduling of advancement by the organization. 
Finally, even though the clearest evidence for the influence of orga-
nizational rules on individual achievement was found in provisions of con-
tracts that are simple s tructure, probably the more significant issues for 
sociologists relate to unitary s tructure. This administrative f ramework is 
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applied in ra ther complex organizat ional set t ings. It add res ses a need for 
corporate integration by facil i tating personne l f lows among subuni t s , as 
well as express ing co rpo ra t e v iews about oppor tun i ty and a t ta inment that 
are unfettered by the c o m p r o m i s e s fo rced on personne l sys tems by union 
contracts. 
The associated p rocedures of j o b analysis and compensa t ion manage-
ment are s tandard topics in bus iness schools , in wide use in Amer ican 
industry. These t echn iques under ly the fo rma t ion of p romot ion ladders , 
job families, and t ransfe r rules ; indeed , fo r a substant ia l p ropor t ion of the 
labor force they are ma jo r de t e rminan t s of p rospec t ive s ta tus and com-
pensation advancemen t . M o r e o v e r , the methodological p rocedures of un-
itary s t ructure have been injected into social policy deba te s . They are 
instrumental in recent at tempts to ascertain equitable pay rates for women 
in organizations having a high level of sex segregat ion of j o b s (see , e .g . , 
Treiman and Ha r tmann 1981). 
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NOTES 
1. The most prevalent strategy is to add contextual data by utilizing the Census' industry 
and occupational codes. Common sources of industry and occupation information are census 
data, the Department of Labor's DOT file, and the University of Michigan's Quality of 
Employment Survey. 
2. For example, Wise (1975:922) analyzed attainment in "a large manufacturing cor-
poration." Rosenbaum (1979:29) studied promotion chances in "a large, autonomous, 
investor-owned company having offices in many cities and towns in one region of the United 
States." Halaby (1980:15) investigated career trajectories using data from "a California-
based utility firm." 
3. In the few investigations that have been carried out using personnel data files from 
multiple firms or agencies (e.g., Boijas, 1983; Halaby, 1980; Medoff and Abraham, 1980), 
the apparent objective has been to replicate findings or to estimate a common model, rather 
than to explore the consequences of organizational differences for individual attainment. 
Several cross-national studies of work places, however, have attempted truly comparative 
analyses of institutional structures, and achievement (see, e.g.. Cole, 1979; Dore, 1973). 
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4. This information is from a conversation with Mr. Victor Rodriguez, Assistant Vice 
President, Equitable Life, June 6, 1984. 
5. Wage comparisons and salary linkages, formal and informal, can even transcend 
work organization boundaries. For example, in New York City, firemen demand salary 
equity with policemen while sanitation workers negotiate a wage that is 90 percent of the 
policeman/fireman's salary (New York Times, 1975:15). These linkages are customary. They 
reflect neither parity of skills nor a promotion sequence. A report by the Urban Institute 
(Dickson, Hovey, and Peterson, 1980) indicates that nearly identical salaries are paid to 
police officers and firemen in many large cities, but that there is considerable variation 
among cities in refuse collectors' salaries, as a percentage of the former. Thus the linkage 
with refuse collectors is either weak or variable. 
6. The collective bargaining agreement for 1974-1976 with Consolidated Diesel Electric 
(no date:92-93) provides for wage progression, enabling an employee to advance from the 
minimum rate of pay to the maximum rate for his or her job title. Three raises per year, 
each in the amount of $6.00/week, are scheduled; the raises are automatic for all employees 
performing satisfactory service. 
7. In its traditional formulation, the compensation of Japanese workers in a large cor-
poration can be viewed principally as a function of individual characteristics that are "set" 
at the time of entry, for example, education and date of hiring (seniority). The compensation 
of an employee is not very sensitive to variables endogenous to the work career—evaluations 
of performance or occupational position—though there is evidence that job-related wages 
are becoming an increasing component of total compensation (Marsh and Mannari. 1976:120-
156). The traditional reward structure is consistent with an orientation in which cohesion 
and cooperation are stressed and in which long-term employment is the norm. Salary and 
status become obtainable rewards for most employees, rather than being reserved for the 
meritorious and competitive. One consequence of a seniority-graded reward structure is 
that employees can be moved among jobs as demand necessitates, without the complexities 
of salary adjustments or union jurisdictional boundaries (Dore, 1973:38-40; Tsuda. 1974:399-
415). 
8. Elaborate jurisdictional statements can be found in contracts in the construction, 
printing, and theatre industries. Such provisions appear to be articulated in great detail 
where skill differences are small and, therefore, where the right to perform particular tasks 
must be protected by contract. Restrictions on lateral entry appear in promotion clauses. 
A common statement is the following: "When a job is to be filled in any department, such 
job shall [first | be awarded by the company to the employee with greatest seniority in a 
lower classification in that department" (Bureau of Labor Statistics, I970b:5). Bumping and 
layoff provisions tend to have a complex formulation in union contracts, with several "clocks" 
being evaluated: seniority in the plant, service in the department, and duration in the job; 
see Bethlehem Steel (1977:35-47) for a typical statement. 
9. We use the term job ladder to denote a hierarchy of positions within an organizational 
unit that are linked by explicit rules governing personnel movements. Career line is a more 
general term. It includes job ladders but also covers sequences of moves that are common 
to employees, even though they are not specified formally and involve shifts among de-
partment units. 
10. In conversations with human resource specialists from a number of large corporations 
(IBM, General Foods. American Express, Texaco), the principal objection raised to union-
ization was the prospect of loss of flexibility, both in assigning employees and in rewarding 
individual performance. Higher labor costs arising from unionization were viewed as a minor 
item. Indeed, possibly to discourage employee susceptibility to organizing drives, some 
firms pay salaries that are above union scale and avoid layoffs during periods of moderate 
economic downturn (Watson, 1963:13-17). 
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11. This assessment refers to the wage schedule viewed on a cross-sectional basis. The 
labor contract with the Fraternal Order of Police in Philadelphia is periodically renegotiated. 
In the past, the salary modifications have been primarily percentage additions to all ranks 
and all seniority levels, reflecting cost of living increases, rather than essential modifications 
to the structure of compensation. 
12. This figure is typical of large city police departments. Comparable promotion rates 
for six departments that supplied data for 1978 range from 0.30 percent/year for Chicago to 
0.65 percent/year for Boston. For New York City, based on a five-year average (1978-1982), 
the rate was 0.39 percent per year. Data are from Chicago Police Personnel Office (1983), 
Washington. D.C. Police Personnel Office (1983), New York Police Personnel Office (1983), 
Philadelphia Police Personnel Office (1983), San Jose Police Personnel Office (1983), and 
Boston Police Personnel Office (1983). 
13. Only the San Jose department responded to a question about the likelihood of ad-
vancement during the course of a police career. They estimate that 10 percent of a typical 
entry cohort in the 1960s and 1970s will have been promoted to sergeant before reaching 
retirement age; 3 percent will have been promoted to a higher rank (San Jose Police Personnel 
Office. 1983). The personnel officer of the Philadelphia department replied as follows: "1 
can only state that . . . career opportunities . . . are extremely limited and if |an applicant's] 
primary interest was upward mobility, I would strongly suggest he look elsewhere" (Phil-
adelphia Police Personnel Office, 1983). 
14. Not surprisingly, this feature of the salary schedule can also be observed from an 
examination of police officer earnings figures. Such data are presented for Philadelphia in 
a September 1980 Municipal Government Wage Survey. For that point in time, 97 percent 
of patrolmen are reported as having monthly earnings in the range $1,500-$ 1.600. All 409 
police sergeants are reported to have monthly earnings between $1,700 and $1,800 (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. (1981a:6). 
15. Because the remuneration of police officers is so much more attractive in Chicago 
than in Philadelphia, especially after the first few years of employment, why do not Phil-
adelphia officers move to Chicago or to another city with a generous progression schedule? 
The reasons are several: there are age ceilings for entry into a police department; no salary 
credit is given by Chicago (or by most cities) for outside service, so the Philadelphia officer 
would have to start again at the entry wage; the seniority benefits accumulated in Philadelphia 
toward retirement would be lost. To digress a moment, it is evident that even in a single 
occupation, in one industry, the compartmentalization of labor can be extensive. 
16. Some thought was given to reporting total compensation figures (salary plus fringe 
benefits) instead of, or in addition to, the salary schedules. This approach was not followed 
for two reasons. First, it is salary information, not total compensation, that is presented in 
schedule form in collective bargaining agreements. The salary component is the most visible 
aspect of the compensation package and probably the most relevant to employees in making 
their comparisons. Indeed, in situations of remuneration linkage between workers in different 
city agencies, it is usually salary, not total compensation, over which the linkage is established 
(e.g., New York Times |I980:B4] report on wages and benefits of municipal jobs in New 
York City). Second, a consideration of fringe benefits would complicate the presentation 
but not alter our conclusions. For an enlightening study of total compensation packages, 
see Dickson, Hovey, and Peterson (1980). In the present paper the term compensation is 
used as a synonym for salary. 
17. The information for this section is based on an analysis of labor agreements in 15 
metropolitan police departments. The three largest U.S. cities were selected; the other cities 
were chosen with the aim of providing coverage to all geographic regions. The provisions 
of 10 of the schedules are summarized in Table 2. 
18. The salary schedule for Boston is unusually complex, and the entries in Table 2 
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underestimate average police officer earnings. Boston pays an additional $3.90 per day above 
the schedule figure for night-shift work. Also, there is a long list of additions to salary for 
patrolmen who perform various specialty jobs. The entries in Table 2 are base salaries for 
day-shift work. 
19. Uniformity of police standards across cities is promoted, first of all, by the procedural 
rules that govern information gathering, arrest, and interrogation. These rules derive from 
constitutional provisions and are codified in federal legislation and in court opinion. Ad-
ditionally, in recent decades, the education and training activities of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Law Enforcement Education Program, and the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police have served to erode community differences in police conduct and in 
the organization of police departments. For details, see Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (1978:5-10, 216). As a result, the duties and requirements of police officers 
would not be expected to vary greatly, especially among large cities. 
20. The most common instance of linkage occurs between the salaries of police officers 
and firefighters. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics, (1976a:30), 6 percent of police 
officer and firefighter contracts contain language that provides for salary parity between the 
two uniformed groups. Far more common are practices of linkage based on tradition rather 
than on explicit clauses. Data presented in Dickson, Hovey, and Peterson (1980:60, 75) 
reveal that in 9 of the 12 cities they surveyed, the salaries of police officers and firefighters 
are identical. 
21. In Philadelphia, the increment for a subject-area department head in a high school 
is 17 percent above the salary of a classroom teacher (at M.A. level, maximum seniority). 
In Boston, the increment is 13 percent; in Los Angeles it is 6 percent. In Chicago and 
Washington. D.C., no salary addition is provided for this position. With respect to opportunity 
for advancement, personnel officers in Philadelphia and Boston estimate that about 10 percent 
of classroom teachers advance to department head or to a higher supervisory position before 
retirement: for Chicago it was estimated that 4 percent of teachers move to a salary scale 
higher than that of classroom teacher (Philadelphia Schools Personnel Office [ 1983], Boston 
Schools Personnel Office (1983], Chicago Schools Personnel Office [1983], Washington, D.C. 
Schools Personnel Office [1983], Los Angeles Schools Personnel Office [1983]). 
22. Public school salary schedules were examined for the same 15 cities from which 
police officer compensation data were obtained. In all of these cities, primary school teachers 
and high school teachers were paid in accordance with a common schedule. 
23. All the school systems provide some salary credit for prior service in another city. 
The generosity of the lateral entry provisions vary considerably, however. For instance, 
Philadelphia gives credit on a year-for-year basis, minus one year. Boston provides credit 
for up to a maximum of three years of outside service (on a nine-annual-step service ladder). 
Chicago has a more involved credit formula which, in most instances, works out to providing 
one year's credit for each two years of service in a different school system. 
24. With the exceptions of Los Angeles and San Jose, columns 3 to 9 constitute a linear 
ordering, in the sense that each entry is to be added to all preceding figures in the row. For 
example, in Philadelphia, an earned M.A. adds $2,715 to salary, 30 credits beyond the M.A. 
is worth an additional $1,828, and so forth. Where school systems have established equi-
valencies between credits and degrees, the salary increment is reported in the credits column, 
because that level of credits is usually a requirement for the degree. Thus, in Washington, 
D.C., a B.A. + 30 credits or an M.A. adds $3,300 to salary; the increment is reported under 
the former column. Likewise, in New York City, an M.A. + 30 credits is equated to a Ph.D. 
for the purpose of allocating increments for advanced education; the addition to salary is 
reported in column 7. 
The preceding interpretation is not correct for Los Angeles and San Jose. In these cities, 
separate increments are allocated for course credits beyond the B.A. and for earned degrees. 
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Thus, in Los Angeles, an M.A. adds $150 to annual salary irrespective of the number of 
earned credits, and a B.A. + 60 credits is worth $3,200 annually irrespective of whether 
or not an advanced degree has been acquired. 
25. This uniformity of standards across public school systems is promoted by the com-
petitive nature of college admissions. The better colleges, by setting more or less similar 
criteria for entrance, encourage public schools throughout the country to develop a relatively 
standard curriculum for college-bound students (see, e.g., New York Times (1984:45]). Also, 
the widespread use by colleges of uniform admissions tests has compelled public school 
systems to standardize the content of course offerings. A sign of the uniformity in teacher 
training, and in the role of school teachers, is provided by the way that service transfer 
regulations are written. Although it is the case that cities differ in the amount of credit they 
will extend for experience in another school system, none of the cities consider the community 
location of the earlier service (except that a few give preferential treatment for prior teaching 
in the same state). 
26. Some evidence of the impact of union militancy on schedule features, as well as on 
the level of teacher salaries, is provided by Perry (1974:36-53). 
27. Although this linkage usually is informal, there are instances in which a correspond-
ence has been recognized in contract. Until the mid-1960s, a formula was in use in New 
York City that equated the salary of full professor at the City University (CUNY) with that 
of high school principal, associate professor with elementary school principal, and the salary 
of assistant professor with assistant principal in an elementary school (United Federation 
of College Teachers, 1963). 
28. In some instances separate rates are negotiated for subspecialties. Thus, bricklayers 
and stonemasons frequently are represented by a single union local, though different wage 
rates may be set for each line of work (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1981b: 1). 
29. The wages of foremen are often specified in union contracts. For example, the pro-
visions of two contracts described in Bureau of Labor Statistics (1975:36) report foreman's 
pay at 10 percent and 11 percent above the journeyman's rate. In a conversation with an 
official of the General Contractors' Association, New York City, the average increment for 
foremen was estimated at 10 percent over the journeyman's wage rate (Regner, 1983). In a 
conversation with a representative of the International Brotherhood of Painters (Blumberg, 
1983), the foreman's increment was described as "one hour a day extra, so that if he works 
seven hours he gets paid for eight." 
30. In a survey of contract provisions in the building trades, the modal category in the 
distribution of foremen was 10-14 workmen per foreman (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1974:13; 
also Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975:4-5). 
31. In the building trades, a distinction is made between union membership and working 
for a contractor holding a collective bargaining agreement. In times of low demand for labor, 
union members may accept employment at a wage below the union scale with a contractor 
who has not signed an agreement. In contrast, employers with collective bargaining agree-
ments are required to employ only union members (unless none is available) and to pay the 
union scale. Wage-rate data collected by the Department of Labor generally notes the col-
lective bargaining status of the contractor, rather than the union membership of the craftsmen. 
32. Regarding estimates of craft differences in rates of union membership, see Haber 
and Levinson (1956:34-37); concerning the relation between contractor size and the existence 
of a collective bargaining agreement, see Bureau of Labor Statistics (1976b:4). 
33. The seven SMSAs reported in Table 5 were selected from among the 17 metropolitan 
areas with the intent of conveying the variety of community patterns in the wage structure 
of building craftsmen. As a result, intercity differences are accentuated, though not by much, 
compared with what a random selection of communities would show. 
34. Although we use the term status attainment model, we are referring to the generic 
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formulation of explaining current labor force characteristics on the basis of individual-level 
variables. Earnings, rather than status, frequently is the ultimate dependent variable in this 
sort of model (e.g., Duncan, 1969; Jencks, 1972:Appendix B). 
35. Why, then, not seek work in Newark if you are a cement mason in New York City? 
The reason is that if one is not a member of the union local in the community, he must 
obtain either transfer papers or a temporary work permit. These cannot always be acquired, 
especially when work is scarce. Also, a transfer may require passing a trade test and paying 
entrance fees. Even if these barriers are surmounted, many locals give preference in job 
referrals to members who have worked in the jurisdiction for a minimun number of 
years (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975:13-14; Manpower Administration, 1975:13 , 71-76, 
90-95). 
36. Direct evidence for this contention can be found in Bourden and Levitt (1980:33-
35). In an analysis of the wage rates of craftsmen in the construction industry, using a 
national sample, they report that education and experience were insignificant as regressors. 
37. In 20 percent of 769 agreements surveyed by the Department of Labor, a "first-in. 
first-out" procedure was used by the local, in which unemployed craftsmen are referred to 
jobs in the order of their registration on the out-of-work list. In 23 percent of agreements, 
a "group ranking" method was used. Here, workmen are divided into two or more categories, 
frequently on the basis of years of local residence. Preference in referrals is given to one 
group; within the group a first-in, first-out method is followed (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
1974:19; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975:12-14). 
38. There is empirical support for the contention that hours worked is correlated with 
human capital variables. In a survey of training in the building trades (Manpower Admin-
istration 1975, pp. 151-163), it was concluded that, in many locals, journeymen who have 
completed an apprenticeship program tend to be employed more hours in a year than jour-
neymen not trained through apprenticeship. Although the two groups of craftsmen differed 
in other ways that affect hours worked (e.g., the apprenticeship-trained craftsmen were 
younger), it is recognized that journeymen who complete an apprenticeship have a broader 
command of skills than craftsmen who enter the union via a different route, such as when 
the shop in which they are working is organized (Manpower Administration, 1975:45). 
39. Typically, union contracts specify that a certain ratio of older workers to total em-
ployment must be maintained. Commonly used ratios are 1:4 and 1:5. The term older worker 
tends to refer either to the age group over 50 or to the cohort over 55 (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1974:21; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975:16). 
40. The attrition rate for police officers is very low, probably as a result of the occupational 
community that exists among policemen and the generous benefits that accrue to seniority, 
especially the possibility of retiring after 20 years service with a pension equal to half the 
final year's salary. Police officials in Philadelphia have estimated an average departure rate 
of 2 percent per year for a beginning cohort, with much of this attrition coming in the initial 
years of service (Philadelphia Police Personnel Office, 1983). This figure translates into a 
retention rate of 67 percent at the 20-year-service point. Also, a study of a cohort of 1,915 
men who entered the New York City Police Department in 1957 reported a loss rate of one-
and-a-half percent per year over the initial 12 years of service (Cohen and Chaiken, 1972). 
Estimates of the attrition rates of school teachers are somewhat higher—crude turnover 
rates of 6.1 percent per year in Boston during 1977-81 (Boston Schools Personnel Office, 
1983), 3.8 percent in Chicago during 1982-1983 (Chicago Schools Personnel Office, 1983). 
Yet, these figures are far below assessments of the rate of employer change in the labor 
force (e.g., based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data for 1975, Mobley 11982:9] calculates 
an annualized quit rate of 16.8% from manufacturing firms; using PSID data for 1968-1974, 
Freeman 11980:659] reports annual turnover rates for union and nonunion workers averaging 
to 12.1 percent). 
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41. These occasional raises advance the salaries of senior employees above that of new 
hires, but not by much, because the entry wage is raised in each new contract. 
42. It is not the case that this pattern could be summarized more succinctly by a formula 
different from equation 1. Over the years, the insurance company has made numerous ad 
hoc adjustments to parts of the schedule to keep its salaries in line with those of competing 
firms. 
43. In note 9 we distinguished between job ladder and career line. Now we have the 
insurance company using a related term, job focus! This construct overlaps with the preceding, 
more-structural terms devised by organization! researchers. Focus is best thought of as a 
collection of job ladders from the same type of work, though the individual job ladders may 
be in different organizational units (e.g., secretarial job ladders, programmer job ladders). 
44. With the exception of a few titles, such as vice-president, whose use is restricted 
by the company, job titles can be assigned by a manager to reflect the tasks particular to 
his or her organizational unit. Other than the job foci, there are no company-wide occupational 
categories. 
45. A classification system of job evaluation is used for job titles in Grades 1-4; a factor-
comparison procedure is employed to rate titles in the higher grades. 
46. Company rules require that newly employed workers be paid at a rate that is below 
the midpoint of the salary grade; further, managers are encouraged to hire at a wage close 
to the grade minimum. 
47. In the 10 police departments—assuming retirement at sergeant rank—the average 
salary growth, relative to the entry rate, was 61 percent (Table 3). In the 10 public school 
systems—assuming B.A. at entrance, and B.A. plus 60 advanced credits at retirement— 
the average salary growth over the career course was 85 percent (Table 4). In the unionized 
sector of the construction industry there is no appreciation in wage rate, though there may 
be a modest increase, with experience, in annual salary. 
48. The text figures are for entrants in all career lines. The variance remains large even 
if we restrict attention to salary-grade changes in an occupational specialty. For example, 
among secretaries, during the same five year interval, 19 percent had advanced by at least 
four grades while 6 percent had not changed salary grade. 
49. The experience of working with the personnel records of a firm makes evident the 
considerable difficulty of assessing attainment over the life course using a representative 
population sample. For instance, in the insurance company, secretaries range from Grade 
1 to Grade 7 (Table 7). Responsibility, status, and salary in this occupational specialty differ 
considerably over the grade sequence; indeed, as noted in the text, a grade increase is 
defined by the company as a promotion. Nonetheless, the occupational coding schemes in 
general use for analyzing mobility with a representative population sample, such as the 
Census Bureau's three-digit classification, provide a single code for secretary. A similar 
problem exists with the police career ranks: patrolman, detective, sergeant, lieutenant, and 
captain are mapped onto a single code (964) in the 1970 Census classification. (The 1980 
occupational codes are a bit more sensitive to police ranks, allocating two codes (414, 418) 
to the five titles.) As a consequence, the picture of mobility created by the analysis of data 
sets such as OCG 1, OCG 2, and the one-in-a-hundred census files is distorted by the very 
different degrees of occupational detail presented for the individual industries. 
50. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1978:48) reports somewhat different figures, namely that 
automatic progression was specified in 74 percent of labor contracts. 
51. An example of typical wording: "When a vacancy exists in a job classification covered 
by the contract, and the senior applicant for the job can meet the standards and qualifications 
required to perform that particular job competently . . . [he] shall be offered the promotion, 
even though . . . [he] may not be the most competent applicant for the job" (Long Island 
Lighting. 1970). 
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52. Contract clauses on these matters are often phrased in a way that is amenable to 
formal modeling. The "dead time" provision, for example, closely follows the imagery of 
a "type 1" counter (Cinlar, 1975:309). Also, a promotion recipe to the effect that the most-
senior individual in the organizational unit will be advanced, implies a monotone increas-
ing hazard rate, whereas a provision that the most-senior individual will be advanced, pro-
vided he is qualified, can be formulated as a mixture of hazard rates for two types of indi-
viduals. 
53. In addition to involving multiple clocks, the bumping district can vary with the length 
of service. An extreme example: "An employee . . . who is notified that, through force 
reduction, employment cannot be continued in the present job, shall have job transfer 
rights. . . Employees having one but less than three years seniority may exercise their option 
within the same district. Employees having three but less than six years seniority may exercise 
their option within the same division. Employees having six or more years seniority may 
exercise their option within the collective bargaining unit" (General Telephone Company 
of Ohio, 1971). 
54. It must be emphasized that the categories are based on an examination of personnel 
rules from some 60 firms, and that these firms are not representative of the labor market. 
I believe that the classification captures an essential distinction in the way opportunity is 
structured. However, a larger number of firms, drawn from other industries, might yield 
different categories; surely subcategories of the rules structures can be expected to emerge 
as the number of work organizations is increased. 
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